Amiya Arknights Live Wallpaper

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality weak.

Six findings, and every one is the same observation: code in the extension calls the browser's fetch API. That is the whole set. No malware signature matched, no suspicious indicators were extracted, no obfuscation was detected, and the code-smell, secret and dependency checks all came back empty. For a Chrome extension with 227 users and a version number of 2.2, that is a thin file.

The call sites are js/background.js at lines 63, 82 and 96, js/popup.js:39, js/sidePanel.js:362 and js/weather.js:49. Taken together they line up with the description. The extension advertises an HD live video wallpaper for the new tab page, and js/weather.js:49 is a request coming from a file named for weather, which fits the common pattern of a wallpaper that also shows a local forecast. js/background.js would refresh the wallpaper source while the tab is idle, and js/popup.js:39 and js/sidePanel.js:362 would load settings or a preview when someone opens the popup or the side panel. A video wallpaper cannot run without pulling media from somewhere.

Where those requests go is the missing piece. The captured endpoint list is empty, and the declared permissions and host permissions are empty too. That reads as an extraction gap. A wallpaper extension that streams video has to hold a host permission for its media source or it would not function, and the finding titles record the mechanism, a fetch, without the destination.

On naming, Amiya and Arknights are well-known franchise names, so this presents as a fan wallpaper. There is no character substitution, no borrowed branding, and no attempt to pass as uBlock Origin or Dark Reader. The publisher contact is an email address, [email protected], which is how small wallpaper studios usually publish.

A skeptic would say a wallpaper extension has no business making six network calls, and that fetch calls with unseen destinations are where data exfiltration starts. That reading does not fit here. The calls are spread across four files that each have a media or weather job, and the shape you would expect from a stealer, cookie or history access wired to a hardcoded collection endpoint, would produce suspicious-domain hits and code-pattern matches. None appear. The scanned files hold no payload signature and no hidden encoding.

What would settle it is the manifest's host_permissions and the literal URL strings passed at js/background.js:63 and js/weather.js:49. If those resolve to a media CDN or a weather API, the picture is complete.

Key Reasons

• All six findings are generic fetch-API detections with no destination URL recorded
• js/weather.js:49, js/popup.js:39 and js/sidePanel.js:362 map onto the advertised wallpaper and weather features
• Zero malware signatures, IoCs, obfuscation, secrets or dependency findings across the scanned files
• No impersonation signals: the name references a game franchise rather than cloning a popular security or utility extension
• Declared permissions and host permissions are empty, which points to an extraction gap rather than concealment

False Positive Considerations

• Network findings only note that fetch exists, not which domain is contacted
• Empty endpoint and permission extraction leaves every finding without domain context
• A wallpaper that also shows weather legitimately needs outbound requests from background, popup and weather scripts

Reviewed 2026-10-18; recommended action: no action; model confidence 72%.