Himiko Toga My Hero Academia Live Wallpaper

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

The entire finding set is six network findings, and every one of them is a plain fetch call: js/background.js at lines 63, 82 and 96, js/popup.js at line 39, js/sidePanel.js at line 362, and js/weather.js at line 49. All six are severity medium and none carries a destination, a payload or a description. A live wallpaper extension that renders HD video on the new tab page has to pull those assets from somewhere, and js/weather.js:49 names its own purpose in the filename: it fetches a weather reading for the widget. That accounts for the requests without needing a malicious explanation.

Nothing else in the scan supports an attack story. Malware signature matches are zero, obfuscation detections are zero, secret findings are zero, and dependency findings are zero. The IoC extractor produced nothing at all, so no hardcoded command-and-control host, tracking domain or login-page target was identified anywhere in the source. There is no bundled dist/ tree producing multiplicative matches either, which means the low finding count reflects the real code rather than a sampling gap.

The manifest side is the strongest signal. The extension declares an empty permissions array and no host permissions. Code that cannot request cookies, browsing history, tabs or site access has no route to credential theft or session riding, whatever its fetch calls turn out to do. The publisher is identified as [email protected], which matches a wallpaper site rather than an anonymous throwaway address, and the install base is 47 users, far too small to be worth building a hijack around.

The obvious counterargument is that a new tab replacement is the standard delivery vehicle for a browser hijacker: swap the search box, point it at a paid search domain, collect the redirect revenue. That is a real pattern and worth checking on any extension in this category. It does not apply here because none of the machinery is present. There is no custom search domain in the findings, no dynamically assembled URL template, no history API call, and no host permission that would let the code rewrite a request. The only capability the evidence shows is loading remote media and a weather value.

What would change this? Resolving the six fetch destinations. No network endpoints are listed for the extension, so the URLs behind js/background.js:63 and js/sidePanel.js:362 are unknown to us. If those resolve to a domain unrelated to wallpaper hosting or weather, the picture changes. As it stands, the findings fit an ordinary media-loading extension and fit none of the threats in the category list.

Key Reasons

• All six findings are undirected fetch calls in js/background.js, js/popup.js, js/sidePanel.js and js/weather.js, which is the expected behaviour of a video wallpaper with a weather widget.
• Zero malware signatures, zero obfuscation detections, zero secrets and zero dependency findings across the package.
• The extension declares no permissions and no host permissions, leaving no route to cookies, history, tabs or credential theft.
• No custom search domain, URL template or history API usage appears anywhere, so the browser-hijack pattern common to new tab extensions is absent.
• Publisher is [email protected], a wallpaper site, with a 47-user install base that offers no monetisation incentive.

False Positive Considerations

• Network findings recorded for fetch calls without any resolved destination URL
• New tab replacement category treated as a hijack signal despite no search or navigation override in the findings
• No IoC extractor or code-smell noise present, so the six medium-severity network entries dominate the score
• Media and weather asset loading in a wallpaper extension counted the same as outbound data transmission

Reviewed 2026-10-14; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 80%.