Yanagi Zenless Zone Zero Live Wallpaper

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

Yanagi Zenless Zone Zero Live Wallpaper replaces the Chrome new tab page with artwork of the Zenless Zone Zero character Yanagi. It is published under the contact address [email protected], sits at version 2.2, and has 353 users. The manifest lists no permissions and no host permissions, which matters more than anything below: without them the extension cannot read tabs, history, cookies, clipboard or form input, and cannot run scripts on the pages you visit. What is left is the ability to swap the new tab page and make outbound requests from its own background, popup and side panel scripts.

Six findings record those requests: NET-FETCH-js/background.js-63, -82 and -96, NET-FETCH-js/popup.js-39, NET-FETCH-js/sidePanel.js-362 and a single call in js/weather.js:49. Every one is a plain fetch. A weather widget and a wallpaper rotator both need to pull remote content, and the medium severity attached to these is the default for any remote call rather than a judgment about the destination. None of the six titles names a hardcoded host.

The 144 indicators in the network category are the bulk of the noise. The endpoint list holds entries such as 0f.cl, 3v.la, 4t.nu, is.si and ce.support, plus two strings carrying a non-Latin character inside the label: aԩp.li and j8唦u.tm. Nobody registers a domain with a stray Armenian or CJK glyph in the middle of the name. Two-letter labels under obscure country suffixes (.sj, .va, .tm, .nu) are the shape an extractor produces when it slices property chains and variable names out of minified JavaScript. That is why the list is packed with plausible-looking garbage and contains nothing that resembles a real API host.

The remaining 45 findings are low-severity code smells of the kind that fire on any nontrivial JavaScript. There are zero malware signatures, zero obfuscation findings, zero secrets and zero tool-poisoning findings. Nothing here reads as a payload.

A skeptic would push back on two points. First, 144 endpoints is a large number, and an extension with no host permissions can still send blind cross-origin requests. Second, js/background.js was not given a manifest-level review, so the permission list in this evidence could be incomplete. Both objections are fair and both are answerable. An extension that cannot read tabs, cookies or page content has little worth sending anywhere, and the endpoint list does not survive a single look, since aԩp.li and j8唦u.tm cannot be resolved by any DNS server. What would change this picture is a manifest read showing a content script matching all URLs, or a fetch destination assembled from cookie or tab data inside js/background.js. Neither is present in what was scanned.

Key Reasons

• Manifest declares no permissions and no host permissions, so the extension cannot access tabs, cookies, history or page content
• The 144 network indicators are extractor artifacts such as aԩp.li and j8唦u.tm, which contain non-Latin characters no real hostname would use
• All six NET-FETCH findings in js/background.js, js/popup.js, js/sidePanel.js and js/weather.js are plain fetch calls consistent with wallpaper and weather content
• Zero malware signatures, zero obfuscation findings, zero secrets and zero tool-poisoning findings
• The 45 code-smell findings are low severity and match generic JavaScript patterns

False Positive Considerations

• XIOC substring extraction turning minified property chains into ccTLD-like domains (0f.cl, 4t.nu, is.si)
• Endpoint strings with embedded non-Latin glyphs (aԩp.li, j8唦u.tm) indicating parser garbage
• 45 low-severity code-smell findings on ordinary widget JavaScript
• Generic fetch calls in a new-tab template with a bundled weather widget (js/weather.js:49)

Reviewed 2026-10-17; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 76%.