Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
Vende+
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 6 days ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 61B…E60
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is Vende+ safe?
Vende+ is a CRM add-on for WhatsApp Web. It reads the chat list and conversations open in your browser so you can tag contacts, track follow-ups and keep a pipeline. The extension talks to app.wascript.com, which is its own backend, and to api.statsigcdn.com, a service that manages feature flags. The manifest captured for this build lists no host permissions or API permissions, so the endpoint list is the best guide to where it sends data.
Most of what the scanner flagged is what any extension built from a JavaScript bundler produces. There are 22 network findings, all generic library patterns: NET-SOCKET_IO in files like v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28966.js, NET-FETCH in background.js, and NET-JQUERY_AJAX in two of the content bundles. A CRM that keeps a WhatsApp inbox in sync needs that kind of connection. Two obfuscation findings, OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js and OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in one of the content files, match minified bundle output rather than hidden code.
The longest list of flagged items, the domain indicators, is also the least meaningful. It contains CSS values like border.radius.circle and btn.glass, an API event name, calls.function.arguments.delta, and Atlassian developer hostnames from a design library compiled into the build. None of those is a server the extension contacts.
That is why the flags say more about the scanner's habits than about this extension. Nothing matched a malware signature, no credentials or secrets turned up, and no behavior showed that falls outside the job of a WhatsApp CRM. The thing to weigh is that a tool like this can see your WhatsApp conversations and syncs them to wascript.com. That is what the product does.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289240.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28927.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289105.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | funnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jsfluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.jscrm/assets/css/style.css +16 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | whatsapp/wpp/index.jsfunnil/index.jsfunnil/assets/ttf/Segoeui.chunk.ttf +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | crm/assets/js/b3c3d2a2-f432-4ecd-a3f4-0b4582cc4a6c.B8_nURbH.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2898.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28952.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | crm/assets/js/index.CP_EcveZ.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289192.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28914.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | fluxo/assets/js/emoji-picker-react.esm.LrTXoimj.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289167.js_metadata/verified_contents.json +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | crm/assets/js/b3c3d2a2-f432-4ecd-a3f4-0b4582cc4a6c.B8_nURbH.jsfunnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28936.jswhatsapp/wpp_module/index.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | crm/assets/js/2b070b0a-2c0f-4c9c-bb5b-938727270e32.CWg5n8f0.jsfunnil/assets/js/2e0cf7f6-e9bc-41e0-84b5-f570a0e461c8.B8VBrnTG.js_metadata/verified_contents.json +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289261.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2893.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289149.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jscrm/assets/js/b15575b9-e8eb-4d64-83b8-37d47f2b0b0a.BbRllemT.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289240.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28984.jscrm/assets/js/comp.dLjCYb0m.js +169 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
Vende+ is a Chrome extension that layers CRM features onto WhatsApp Web: tagging chats, tracking follow-ups, and keeping a shared contact list. The shipped code is a bundled build under content/assets/js/, with hashed filenames like v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js.
Across 1,210 recorded findings there are zero malware signatures, zero leaked secrets, and zero tool-poisoning hits. Everything the scanner flagged falls into three groups, and each group traces back to how the extension is built.
The 22 network findings are library-pattern detections. NET-SOCKET_IO fires in v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28966.js and v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289149.js, NET-FETCH fires in background.js:137 and in most of the content script bundles, and NET-JQUERY_AJAX fires in v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28923.js and v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28924.js. A CRM that keeps a WhatsApp inbox in sync needs a persistent channel to its backend, which is what Socket.IO provides, plus ordinary fetch calls for the REST side. These titles describe transport, not a target.
The obfuscation bucket holds two items. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js is the shape a bundled stylesheet or inlined image takes when a data URI is base64 encoded. OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js is what minified JavaScript looks like after a bundler wraps its exports. Neither file pairs that output with a malware signature.
The IoC list is the clearest noise. It includes border.radius.circle, btn.glass and color.border.accent.orange, which are CSS design tokens, plus calls.function.arguments.delta, a streaming API event name. api.dev.atlassian.com and api.atlassian-us-gov-mod.com come from an Atlassian design system library compiled into the build. api.statsigcdn.com is a feature-flag service. The captured manifest lists no host permissions and no API permissions, which reads as a parsing gap rather than a real absence of access for an extension running content scripts on WhatsApp Web.
A skeptic has a fair case. The publisher address is a generic [email protected] rather than a company domain, the install base is 12 users, and app.wascript.com is a backend that receives data from a content script able to read WhatsApp conversations. That last point is the real question: a WhatsApp CRM reads messages by design, so the trust decision is about where that data goes. The evidence shows no credential-theft indicators against login domains, no cookie extraction, no hidden payload, and no hostname that reads as exfiltration infrastructure. app.wascript.com is the extension's own service endpoint, which is where a CRM's data would go. What would settle the remaining doubt is a published privacy policy naming wascript.com as the processor, which this bundle does not contain.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware-signature, malware, secret and tool-poisoning matches across 1,210 findings; only generic transport detections (NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-FETCH, NET-JQUERY_AJAX) inside bundled content/assets/js files.
- The IoC set is extractor noise: design tokens such as border.radius.circle and btn.glass, the event name calls.function.arguments.delta, and Atlassian design-system hostnames.
- Obfuscation hits (OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js, OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js) match minified/bundled output, not payload hiding.
- Socket.IO and fetch usage matches the stated function of keeping a WhatsApp Web inbox in sync, so behavior and description agree.
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor misreading CSS design tokens and API event names as domains
- 754 code-smell findings inside a minified content script bundle
- Obfuscation rules firing on standard bundler output (base64 data URIs, indirect function wrapping)
- Third-party design-system and analytics hostnames (Atlassian, Statsig) compiled into the build
Reviewed 2026-10-12; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 72%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
6 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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