Firefox Add-ons Verified domain

Montara Pass

by Montara Project · 1 users
11c5e87c-2d80-5efc-9434-62f1629adc58 | Store v2.13.0
55/ 100
MEDIUM risk
No change since v2.12.2
AI review verdict
Review before use

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (55/100) still counts them. The review covers version 2.9.0, not the analysed version 2.13.0.

Analysis record

Analysed
Today 22 November 2026
Version
v2.13.0
Artifact
SHA256 18061e6a…8dee0d
Detail
Full list

Is Montara Pass safe?

Montara Pass fills and saves logins from an encrypted vault, so it has to talk to the company's sync service to do its job. The scan recorded traffic to montarapass.com, app.montarapass.com and docs.montarapass.com, which are the vendor's own addresses. The permission lists came back empty, which for a password filler is odd enough that we treat it as a gap in collection rather than proof the add-on asks for nothing.

The two medium findings, NET-FETCH-chunks/use-vault-items-BVE-YvqN.js-1 and NET-FETCH-chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.js-1, are fetch calls inside bundled code. If they were malicious they would be shipping your decrypted logins somewhere. Here they sit in files named for pulling vault items into the popup, and the only service address they reach is the vendor's own domain.

Most of the finding count is scanner noise. The endpoint list is full of things like nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place and window.innerheight-n.top, which are pieces of JavaScript property access and arithmetic that a pattern matcher read as web addresses. The .arpa entries such as ipv4only.arpa and service.arpa are reserved DNS names used by network libraries. The 68 low-severity code-quality hits fire on any bundled JavaScript. No malware signature matched, no obfuscation was found, no secrets were exposed.

What would change our mind: a request carrying vault data to an address outside montarapass.com, or a decoded manifest showing permissions the scan missed.

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

95 findings

YARA Rule Matches

11 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
LOWpostinstall persistence mechanism 4
content-scripts/passkey-page.jscontent-scripts/content.jsbackground.js +1 more
-
LOWLocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed 1
chunks/full-vault-B6zrefVk.js
-
LOWpostinstall file download 8
chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.jschunks/popup-DcLzl2gS.jschunks/es6-qC4ayDAm.js +5 more
-
LOWNoUseWeakRandom 3
content-scripts/content.jschunks/form-BlPxEOY_.jschunks/layout-DMLkDfhC.js
-
LOWpostinstall environment access 10
chunks/es6-qC4ayDAm.jschunks/form-BlPxEOY_.jschunks/index.esm-JEo9WZbq.js +7 more
-
LOWpostinstall crypto operations 18
chunks/items-CZ7D7QQp.jschunks/schemas-ByTpYaw6.jschunks/popup-DcLzl2gS.js +15 more
-
LOWpostinstall file manipulation 13
chunks/items-CZ7D7QQp.jscontent-scripts/content.jscontent-scripts/passkey-page.js +10 more
-
LOWpostinstall network communication 11
background.jschunks/form-BlPxEOY_.jsMETA-INF/cose.manifest +8 more
-
LOWpostinstall registry modification 2
chunks/layout-DMLkDfhC.jschunks/full-vault-B6zrefVk.js
-
LOWpostinstall obfuscation 11
manifest.jsonchunks/passkey-D5uUxVFo.jschunks/full-vault-B6zrefVk.js +8 more
-
LOWpostinstall system command 12
chunks/items-CZ7D7QQp.jschunks/es6-qC4ayDAm.jschunks/use-vault-items-BBND4_Yo.js +9 more
-

Network Indicators

Concrete URLs, domains, IPs, emails, and hashes extracted from the analyzed artifact.

60 total

Loading network indicators

Long lists can take a few seconds.

Publisher Evidence

Limited evidence

Montara Project

Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.

Firefox does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.

32
Publisher domain
montarapass.com
Observed
Store verification signal
Limited signal
Limited
Extension portfolio
1
Portfolio

13 evidence rows available.

Finding Categories

2
Network
60
IoC Indicators

YARA Rules Matched

11 rules(93 hits)
postinstall persistence mechanism LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed postinstall file download NoUseWeakRandom postinstall environment access postinstall crypto operations postinstall file manipulation postinstall network communication postinstall registry modification postinstall obfuscation postinstall system command

Requested Permissions

8 permissions
http://*/*
Dangerous
https://*/*
Dangerous
identity

Access your identity and sign-in tokens

High
activeTab
Medium
storage
Low
scripting
Low
alarms
Low
clipboardWrite
Low

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

Montara Pass is a password manager built by Montara Project, and its job is to fill logins from an encrypted vault. The two highest-severity findings are medium network hits, NET-FETCH-chunks/use-vault-items-BVE-YvqN.js-1 and NET-FETCH-chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.js-1. Both sit in chunk files whose names describe the work: loading vault items and pulling in a plugin bundle. A vault filler that never opened a connection could not sync anything.

The 58 indicator entries are where the volume comes from, and they collapse on inspection. The endpoint list carries ipv4only.arpa, service.arpa, resolver.arpa, eap.arpa and 6tisch.arpa, all special-use DNS names that turn up in network discovery code. It also carries nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place, globalthis.chrome, button.link, span.apple and secret.contact, which are JavaScript property access chains (NodeFilter.SHOW, GlobalThis.chrome) read as hostnames by the extractor. window.innerheight-n.top is arithmetic lifted from minified source. None of these resolve to anything.

The domains that are real belong to the vendor or to libraries it bundles. montarapass.com, app.montarapass.com and docs.montarapass.com are the service the extension exists to talk to. prosemirror.net and tailwindcss.com are the homepages of the editor and CSS packages shipped in the bundled assets. mozilla.com is a documentation link. Nothing in the list points at an unrelated third party.

The remaining 68 findings are code-smell rules at low severity, the kind that match any non-trivial JavaScript bundle. No malware signature matched. Obfuscation findings are at zero, so the chunks read as minified build output rather than packed payloads. Secret and dependency categories are empty as well.

The strongest argument against this reading is that a password manager is the most attractive target in the store, the publisher is small, and the extraction recorded no permissions and no host permissions at all. That last point deserves care: a filler that reads forms and injects credentials needs host access, so an empty list here points at a collection gap rather than a genuinely permissionless add-on. The gap doesn't move the verdict, because the network findings themselves are ordinary vault traffic to the vendor's own domain, and no file in the scan sends data anywhere else.

Two things would change the verdict. A network finding to a domain outside montarapass.com would, and so would a decoded manifest showing broad host permissions the extractor missed. Until one of those shows up, this is a small password manager whose score is driven by bundled code and pattern-matching noise.

Key Reasons

  • Only network findings are fetch calls in chunk files named for vault items and plugin loading (chunks/use-vault-items-BVE-YvqN.js, chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.js), consistent with a password manager syncing from app.montarapass.com
  • Zero malware signatures, zero obfuscation, zero secret and zero dependency findings across 128 total findings
  • IoC list is dominated by property-access chains (nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place, globalthis.chrome) and reserved .arpa names (ipv4only.arpa, service.arpa) that cannot resolve
  • Named developer with matching first-party domains montarapass.com, app.montarapass.com and docs.montarapass.com
  • The remaining 68 findings are low-severity code-smell rules that fire on any minified JavaScript bundle

False Positive Considerations

  • XIOC misparses of JavaScript property chains as hostnames (nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place, globalthis.chrome, secret.contact)
  • Reserved special-use .arpa DNS names from network discovery code counted as endpoints (ipv4only.arpa, service.arpa, resolver.arpa, eap.arpa, 6tisch.arpa)
  • 68 low-severity code-smell rules firing on minified dist/bundle output
  • Library homepages and first-party vendor domains (prosemirror.net, tailwindcss.com, montarapass.com) flagged as suspicious endpoints

Reviewed 2026-10-28 · version 2.9.0; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 82%.

Firefox version history

Risk trend by version

5 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.

Selected
55
Change since first
No change
Change from previous
No change
Versions:
First analyzed version
2.8.0
First seen Oct 25, 2026
Risk range
55 to 55
Across analyzed versions
Latest analyzed version
2.13.0
First seen Nov 22, 2026
Selected version
medium
Version
v2.13.0
First seen Today
Risk score
55
Findings
155
Change vs previous
0

Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.

Source Code Viewer

Source Code Not Available

Source code is not available for this version of the extension.

About This Extension

Montara Pass is an end-to-end encrypted password manager. This extension fills and saves logins from your vault. Everything is encrypted in the browser before it leaves your device. The server stores ciphertext and wrapped keys and cannot read your logins. Your master password never reaches the server. <strong>What it does</strong> - Lists the logins saved for the site you are on and fills them when you click Fill - Saves a new login for the current site, with a password generator - Searches your vault and copies a username or password - Opens the full vault in a tab - Optional: a menu inside login fields, off until you turn it on in Settings <strong>How it protects you</strong> - A login is only offered on the site it was saved for, or a subdomain of it - The extension reads no page on its own; it touches a tab only when you click Fill - Unlocked keys stay in memory and are cleared after 15 minutes without use, when the browser closes, or when you lock the vault <strong>Before you start</strong> You need a Montara Pass account and a vault, created in the web app. The extension signs in to an existing vault. If you run your own Montara Pass server, set its address under Settings. Encryption: Argon2id, AES-256-GCM and RSA-OAEP (3072-bit).

Frequently Asked Questions