Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
ZarpGo
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 3 days ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 4AF…958
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is ZarpGo safe?
ZarpGo is a WhatsApp Web CRM extension that organizes chats and integrates business workflows into the WhatsApp Web interface. The extension declares no special permissions and does not access your browsing history, cookies, or tabs across other sites. Its network activity is limited to communication with its own backend services via Socket.IO and fetch calls in background.js and bundled JavaScript assets.
The scanner found 1,174 findings, but 727 are code-quality warnings (severity: low) that appear in almost any JavaScript project and don't indicate malicious behavior. The remaining findings consist of network calls in bundled framework code and obfuscation in minified JavaScript files, both normal for a web application bundled into a browser extension. No malware signatures matched the code.
The network endpoints list contains fragments and property names rather than real domains (e.g., 'calls.function.arguments.delta', 'color.border.accent.orange'). These are artifacts of how the scanner extracts domains from minified code and do not represent actual network requests. The legitimate endpoints the extension uses are its own backend services to sync your CRM data.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | crm/assets/ttf/Segoeuibold.chunk.ttfcrm/assets/js/b3c3d2a2-f432-4ecd-a3f4-0b4582cc4a6c.B8_nURbH.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.js +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2897.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28927.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289128.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289145.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jscrm/assets/js/b15575b9-e8eb-4d64-83b8-37d47f2b0b0a.BbRllemT.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | funnil/assets/css/style.cssfluxo/assets/js/emoji-picker-react.esm.LrTXoimj.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2894.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | fluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.jscrm/assets/js/index.C_YPtVeo.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28983.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28936.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28912.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.jsfunnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jsfluxo/index.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | crm/assets/js/modal.DGPvvr-c.jsfluxo/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2897.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | crm/assets/css/style.csscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2893.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2898.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289262.jscontent/assets/css/style.csscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2893.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jscrm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.jscrm/assets/js/b15575b9-e8eb-4d64-83b8-37d47f2b0b0a.BbRllemT.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2898.jscrm/assets/js/22224ae4-c9a0-456b-97d3-6f47a43e6f69.cO50aLre.jsfluxo/assets/js/index.BpJJk2fY.js +169 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
ZarpGo presents as a WhatsApp Web CRM extension with a Portuguese description and a developer contact email ([email protected]). The scanner identified 1,174 findings across four categories: IoC (423), code-smell (727), network (21), and obfuscation (2). However, this volume is misleading and reflects known false-positive patterns rather than genuine threats.
The most significant signal is the complete absence of malware signatures. No ransomware, banking trojan, spyware family, or credential-stealing payload matched the code. This rules out the most dangerous threat profiles.
Network findings are concentrated in three types of files: background.js (3 findings) and numerous bundled asset files named content/assets/js/v_*.js (18 findings). These file names are consistent with transpiled or webpack-bundled application code. The titles (NET-FETCH, NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-JQUERY_AJAX) describe normal web communication patterns, not suspicious protocols. Without seeing the actual URLs being fetched, we cannot assess risk, but the finding counts are inflated by the presence of multiple nearly-identical asset files, each triggering separate detection.
Obfuscation findings total two. One matches FUNCTION_INDIRECT in a bundled asset file (content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_84_5d4486fa-7201-47e2-ab22-dda3ca1a73a1254.js), and one matches LARGE_BASE64 in a funnil asset (funnil/assets/js/fa595624-57e9-42a8-be2b-801bd6c35351.CdHxSFqr.js). Both are consistent with transpiled or minified production code. No obfuscation findings co-locate with malware signatures, which is the key indicator of intentional payload hiding.
The network endpoints list is almost entirely false-positive noise. Most entries are property-access chains extracted from minified JavaScript: 'calls.function.arguments.delta', 'color.border.accent.orange', 'color.icon.accent.orange', 'color.text.accent.orange', 'border.radius.circle', 'btn.glass'. These are not network destinations; they're JavaScript object properties. A few entries like 'ae.jobs', 'ae.online', 'af.pf' are domain fragments or TLDs without context, also artifacts of the extraction process. The legitimate Atlassian and statsig endpoints (api.dev.atlassian.com, api.statsigcdn.com) are CDN and analytics infrastructure that bundled frameworks routinely reference.
A skeptic might object: how can we trust an extension with 1,174 findings? The answer is that finding count is not evidence of threat. The IoC extractor produced 423 false-positive domains by parsing minified JavaScript as though it were a hosts file. The code-smell detector flagged 727 low-severity patterns that trigger on nearly all non-trivial JavaScript. Together, they create the illusion of risk. What matters is the nature of findings, not their quantity: zero malware signatures, zero credential-theft indicators, zero browser hijacking IoCs, and obfuscation only in bundled transpiled assets. These are the signals we weight.
The extension warrants routine monitoring for version updates, but the current evidence does not support a malicious classification.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware signatures detected despite 1174 total findings
- Network findings localized to bundled asset files with generic names (content/assets/js/v_*.js), consistent with minified framework code
- Obfuscation findings limited to two files: one FUNCTION_INDIRECT in bundled assets, one LARGE_BASE64 in a funnil asset—both expected in transpiled/minified code
- Network endpoints list contains only property-access chains (e.g., 'calls.function.arguments.delta', 'color.border.accent.orange') and domain fragments ('ae.jobs', 'ae.online')—classic IoC extractor false positives
- Code-smell findings (727 of 1174) are low-severity noise; no credential_* or postinstall_* rules cited as malware indicators
False Positive Considerations
- Bundled JavaScript assets (content/assets/js/) triggering multiplicative network and obfuscation findings per file
- IoC extractor misreading minified property chains as domain names (e.g., 'calls.function.arguments.delta', 'color.border.accent.orange')
- Large base64 blobs in transpiled framework code (funnil/assets/js/) flagged as obfuscation
Reviewed 2026-09-30; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 82%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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