SG-X – controls for X/Twitter
Based on the RiskyPlugins AI security review of the observed evidence. The review covers version 2026.10.10, not the analysed version 2026.10.17.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 1 month ago 17 October 2026
- Version
- v2026.10.17
- Artifact
- SHA256 e0806b04…f1c6ce
- Detail
- Full list
Is SG-X – controls for X/Twitter safe?
SG-X adds a handful of controls to X: a download button for media, one-click blocking, a quieter sidebar, a master volume slider and a play-from-start button. The manifest declares no special permissions and no host permissions, and no network endpoints were found outside the page itself. For an extension that only reshapes an existing site's interface, that is the expected shape.
The two entries that were logged are NET-FETCH-content.js-615 and NET-FETCH-content.js-829, both in content.js. They mark fetch calls in the content script. If those calls reached a server the developer controls, that would matter, because a content script running on X can see your timeline and anything the page exposes to it. The findings do not show where the requests go, and with no host permissions in the manifest there is no grant that would let the script talk to a third-party server without that server actively allowing it.
Why we read this as scanner noise instead of extension behaviour: the finding is a generic network-request marker. It fires on any fetch, including the one a download button needs to pull a video file. The package carries no blocklist domains, no malware signatures, no obfuscation and no credential handling, and the listing shows a single user, which is not the shape of a distribution campaign.
No findings
The analyzer reported nothing for this version.
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidenceSG
Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Firefox does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
12 evidence rows available.
No findings
The analyzer reported nothing for this version.
AI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
SG-X – controls for X/Twitter is a Firefox add-on that adds media downloads, one-click blocking, a quieter sidebar, a master volume slider and a play-from-start button to X. The manifest declares no browser permissions and no host permissions, and the package ships no third-party network endpoints. Against that baseline, the entire finding set is two medium-severity network entries, NET-FETCH-content.js-615 and NET-FETCH-content.js-829, both in content.js.
Both findings are generic fetch markers. They record that content.js calls fetch at line 615 and line 829. They do not record a destination, and the endpoint list is empty, so nothing in the evidence names a remote host that receives data. For an extension whose advertised job includes downloading media from X, a fetch call is the mechanism that does the work: pulling a video blob or a higher-resolution image requires a request. The scanner separately logged no blocklist domains, no malware signatures, no obfuscation, no credential-related matches and no manifest anomalies.
The permission profile is the strongest constraint here. With no host permissions in the manifest, a content script running on x.com cannot quietly post your timeline to a developer-controlled server unless that server opts in with permissive CORS headers. There is no host entry there to allow it. Nothing in the package reads cookies, storage keys or password fields; the only capability the manifest grants is the ability to run in the page.
A skeptic would push back on exactly this point. Two unlabelled fetches in a script that sits on top of your logged-in session is a plausible exfiltration shape, and the finding titles give line numbers without targets. That is a fair reading. The extension also has a single listed user and a developer credited only as "SG", so there is no reputation to lean on. What resolves it is the missing infrastructure: no host permissions, no recorded endpoints, no IoC domains, no encoded strings, no bundled remote code. An exfiltration path needs somewhere to send data, and nothing in this package provides one.
The two fetch calls would be fully explained by reading content.js around lines 615 and 829 and confirming the request targets are x.com or its CDN. Until that is done, the honest position is that this noise pattern matches what the network detector produces on small content-script utilities, and the behaviour described in the listing accounts for both findings.
Key Reasons
- Only two findings exist, both generic fetch markers in content.js (NET-FETCH-content.js-615, NET-FETCH-content.js-829) with no recorded destination
- Manifest declares no permissions and no host permissions, so no manifest-level grant enables third-party data transfer
- No IoC domains, malware signatures, obfuscation, secrets or code-smell matches anywhere in the package
- Fetch calls are consistent with the stated media-download feature
- No network endpoints are recorded for the extension
False Positive Considerations
- Generic fetch markers fire on any network call, including same-origin media downloads
- Empty permission and host permission lists leave nothing for a detector to corroborate
- Zero IoC, malware-signature and obfuscation matches, so no corroborating signal exists
- Small content-script utility with no bundled dependencies to inflate finding counts
Reviewed 2026-10-12 · version 2026.10.10; recommended action: no action; model confidence 75%.
Firefox version history
Risk trend by version
2 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.
Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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