Firefox Add-ons

SG-X – controls for X/Twitter

by SG · 1 users
35373da0-d178-5b53-a513-ef06a6a0623a | Store v2026.10.17
0/ 100
MINIMAL risk
-54 since v2026.9.26
AI review verdict
No high-risk signal observed

Based on the RiskyPlugins AI security review of the observed evidence. The review covers version 2026.10.10, not the analysed version 2026.10.17.

Analysis record

Analysed
1 month ago 17 October 2026
Version
v2026.10.17
Artifact
SHA256 e0806b04…f1c6ce
Detail
Full list

Is SG-X – controls for X/Twitter safe?

SG-X adds a handful of controls to X: a download button for media, one-click blocking, a quieter sidebar, a master volume slider and a play-from-start button. The manifest declares no special permissions and no host permissions, and no network endpoints were found outside the page itself. For an extension that only reshapes an existing site's interface, that is the expected shape.

The two entries that were logged are NET-FETCH-content.js-615 and NET-FETCH-content.js-829, both in content.js. They mark fetch calls in the content script. If those calls reached a server the developer controls, that would matter, because a content script running on X can see your timeline and anything the page exposes to it. The findings do not show where the requests go, and with no host permissions in the manifest there is no grant that would let the script talk to a third-party server without that server actively allowing it.

Why we read this as scanner noise instead of extension behaviour: the finding is a generic network-request marker. It fires on any fetch, including the one a download button needs to pull a video file. The package carries no blocklist domains, no malware signatures, no obfuscation and no credential handling, and the listing shows a single user, which is not the shape of a distribution campaign.

No findings

The analyzer reported nothing for this version.

Publisher Evidence

Limited evidence

SG

Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.

Firefox does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.

29
Publisher domain
No domain
Missing
Store verification signal
Limited signal
Limited
Extension portfolio
3
Portfolio

12 evidence rows available.

No findings

The analyzer reported nothing for this version.

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

SG-X – controls for X/Twitter is a Firefox add-on that adds media downloads, one-click blocking, a quieter sidebar, a master volume slider and a play-from-start button to X. The manifest declares no browser permissions and no host permissions, and the package ships no third-party network endpoints. Against that baseline, the entire finding set is two medium-severity network entries, NET-FETCH-content.js-615 and NET-FETCH-content.js-829, both in content.js.

Both findings are generic fetch markers. They record that content.js calls fetch at line 615 and line 829. They do not record a destination, and the endpoint list is empty, so nothing in the evidence names a remote host that receives data. For an extension whose advertised job includes downloading media from X, a fetch call is the mechanism that does the work: pulling a video blob or a higher-resolution image requires a request. The scanner separately logged no blocklist domains, no malware signatures, no obfuscation, no credential-related matches and no manifest anomalies.

The permission profile is the strongest constraint here. With no host permissions in the manifest, a content script running on x.com cannot quietly post your timeline to a developer-controlled server unless that server opts in with permissive CORS headers. There is no host entry there to allow it. Nothing in the package reads cookies, storage keys or password fields; the only capability the manifest grants is the ability to run in the page.

A skeptic would push back on exactly this point. Two unlabelled fetches in a script that sits on top of your logged-in session is a plausible exfiltration shape, and the finding titles give line numbers without targets. That is a fair reading. The extension also has a single listed user and a developer credited only as "SG", so there is no reputation to lean on. What resolves it is the missing infrastructure: no host permissions, no recorded endpoints, no IoC domains, no encoded strings, no bundled remote code. An exfiltration path needs somewhere to send data, and nothing in this package provides one.

The two fetch calls would be fully explained by reading content.js around lines 615 and 829 and confirming the request targets are x.com or its CDN. Until that is done, the honest position is that this noise pattern matches what the network detector produces on small content-script utilities, and the behaviour described in the listing accounts for both findings.

Key Reasons

  • Only two findings exist, both generic fetch markers in content.js (NET-FETCH-content.js-615, NET-FETCH-content.js-829) with no recorded destination
  • Manifest declares no permissions and no host permissions, so no manifest-level grant enables third-party data transfer
  • No IoC domains, malware signatures, obfuscation, secrets or code-smell matches anywhere in the package
  • Fetch calls are consistent with the stated media-download feature
  • No network endpoints are recorded for the extension

False Positive Considerations

  • Generic fetch markers fire on any network call, including same-origin media downloads
  • Empty permission and host permission lists leave nothing for a detector to corroborate
  • Zero IoC, malware-signature and obfuscation matches, so no corroborating signal exists
  • Small content-script utility with no bundled dependencies to inflate finding counts

Reviewed 2026-10-12 · version 2026.10.10; recommended action: no action; model confidence 75%.

Firefox version history

Risk trend by version

2 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.

Latest
54
Change since first
No change
Change from previous
No change
Versions:
First analyzed version
1.0.0
First seen Sep 23, 2026
Risk range
54 to 54
Across analyzed versions
Latest analyzed version
2026.9.26
First seen Sep 26, 2026
Selected version
minimal
Version
v2026.10.17
Analysed 1 month ago
Risk score
0
Findings
0
Change vs previous
-54

Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.

Source Code Viewer

Source Code Not Available

Source code is not available for this version of the extension.

About This Extension

<strong>SG-X – extra controls for X/Twitter</strong> adds five small controls to X/Twitter: download the media of a post in one click, block an account in one click, hide the sidebar's clutter, set one volume for every video, and replay a video from its start. Each one can be switched off. <strong>What it adds</strong> <ul><li><strong>Media downloads.</strong> A download button on posts and in the media viewer. One click saves every photo, video, or GIF attached to the post: the original image as uploaded, or the highest-quality video. Files are named after the post's text.</li><li><strong>One-click blocking.</strong> A block button on each post, so you can block its author without opening the post's menu and confirming. The button always names the account it will block.</li><li><strong>A quieter sidebar.</strong> Hides everything in X's sidebar except search and its suggestions.</li><li><strong>Master volume.</strong> One volume slider and mute button for all videos on X. Your level is applied to every new video, and X's own habit of muting or resetting videos is ignored. On narrow screens it shrinks to the mute button.</li><li><strong>Play from the start.</strong> X often starts a video while you scroll, so you miss its beginning. A rewind button appears over a video while your pointer moves on it. One click rewinds it, applies your volume, and plays it.</li></ul> Each feature has its own switch in the extension's popup. Changes apply at once, with no page reload. SG-X is available in English and French. <strong>Permissions and privacy</strong> SG-X collects nothing. It has no server, no analytics, and no remote code, and the only site it ever talks to is X. <ul><li>It runs only on <a href="https://prod.outgoing.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net/v1/bbbd0abd56d9c27b91509f0839c7f12e3dadb8352ac0ee3d9210043cba246fe1/http%3A//x.com" rel="nofollow">x.com</a> and <a href="https://prod.outgoing.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net/v1/89048a1de851fa717a0c54daa357686619b6fb0d8f43598efc43a0e6aef42dcb/http%3A//twitter.com" rel="nofollow">twitter.com</a>.</li><li>It asks for one permission, <em>storage</em>, to remember your switches and your volume.</li><li>To find the original media files, it reads the data X has already loaded in your tab. This stays in the page's memory and is gone when you close the tab.</li><li>To block an account for you, it reuses the request headers that X's own code sends, including your session's authorization and CSRF token. They are kept in the page's memory only: never stored, never logged, and never sent anywhere except back to X, when you click the block button.</li><li>It makes a network request in two cases only, both started by your click: fetching a media file from X's servers when you download, and one request to X's block endpoint when you block.</li></ul> The full statement is in the <a href="https://prod.outgoing.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net/v1/d354e640eeb7ac3108015337d5e7270377b40d1a461a385385a29daf17f2fcc6/https%3A//github.com/sebastienguillon/sg-x/blob/master/PRIVACY.md" rel="nofollow">privacy policy</a>. <strong>Good to know</strong> <ul><li>Downloading and blocking need you to be signed in to X.</li><li>X changes its pages often. If a button goes missing, please <a href="https://prod.outgoing.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net/v1/7be29625ec7b0b098d1b4be7bac9f3d5ae889762c4145198116d8fec53b713c1/https%3A//github.com/sebastienguillon/sg-x/issues" rel="nofollow">open an issue</a>.</li><li>Only download media you have the right to keep.</li></ul> <strong>Open source</strong> SG-X is free and open source under the MIT license. The code that runs in your browser is built, unminified, from the <a href="https://prod.outgoing.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net/v1/41f52bc7715965aea5f29be744bde5957d4e185651116a73392b0d7354d78554/https%3A//github.com/sebastienguillon/sg-x" rel="nofollow">source on GitHub</a>, and anyone can reproduce the build. SG-X is an independent project. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by X Corp.

Frequently Asked Questions