Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
WhatsJud
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 1 weeks ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 397…74C
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is WhatsJud safe?
WhatsJud adds sales-workflow tools to WhatsApp Web: saved labels, organised chats and quick replies. The manifest declares no special permissions and no host permissions, so it does not get broad access to your browsing. Its reach comes from content scripts that run inside the WhatsApp page, where the code uses fetch calls, jQuery ajax and socket.io connections to keep the CRM in sync with its server in real time.
If those connections were shipping your chats somewhere unexpected, that would matter. The scanner flagged the calls, but the destination list it produced is mostly junk: entries like border.radius.circle, btn.glass and color.border.accent.orange are CSS values picked up as if they were web addresses. The only service hosts in there are api.statsigcdn.com, which serves feature flags, and app.wascript.com. A separate flag points at a base64 blob in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js, one file inside a bundled asset folder. A hidden payload there would be the real story; the blob sits among minified vendor code with no malware signature next to it.
The rest of the pile is volume. Of 1184 findings, 405 are those misread CSS tokens and 754 are code-quality hits that any large JavaScript bundle produces. Nothing matched a malware family, and no finding is rated high or critical. The scanner tripped on how much code there is and how the extractor reads it, not on anything WhatsJud does with your account.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289175.jswhatsapp/wpp/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289209.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | whatsapp/wpp/index.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2894.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | funnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28924.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289195.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28944.js +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28925.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2894.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28929.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289115.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28936.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.jscontent/assets/css/style.csscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289167.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | fluxo/assets/js/b89d7b82-41f7-4061-9bc0-ae95ae5cd0a2.BLiJgZ4E.jscrm/assets/js/b3c3d2a2-f432-4ecd-a3f4-0b4582cc4a6c.B8_nURbH.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | fluxo/assets/js/modal.DwnKkzRB.jsfunnil/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2894.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2897.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28922.jsfluxo/index.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289167.jsfluxo/index.jscrm/assets/js/index.CP_EcveZ.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289149.jscrm/assets/js/b15575b9-e8eb-4d64-83b8-37d47f2b0b0a.BbRllemT.jsfluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | crm/assets/js/index.zzn1EYNa.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289128.jscrm/assets/js/index.CqdIRXBX.js +169 more | - |
Network Indicators
Concrete URLs, domains, IPs, emails, and hashes extracted from the analyzed artifact.
Loading network indicators
IoC detail rows are loaded outside the initial page render.
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
WhatsJud is a CRM overlay for WhatsApp Web, published under the contact address [email protected] at version 7.4.3.87 with nine users on the Chrome Web Store. Its manifest declares no permissions and no host_permissions. The work happens in content scripts injected into the WhatsApp page, and that is where every network finding sits.
Those network findings describe ordinary chat-app plumbing. NET-SOCKET_IO-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28912.js:15 and three sibling socket.io hits flag the library a CRM uses to hold a live connection while you work through conversations. NET-FETCH-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289137.js:1 and its siblings are fetch calls, and NET-JQUERY_AJAX-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28923.js:1 is jQuery's XHR wrapper. background.js:137 makes one more fetch from the service worker. No finding shows a request to a login page, a payment page or a bank.
The endpoint list is where the noise shows. It runs to entries like border.radius.circle, btn.glass, color.border.accent.orange, above.sm, below.sm and calls.function.arguments.delta. Those are CSS property tokens and JavaScript property chains that the extractor read as hostnames. They do not resolve. They are the raw material behind the 405 IoC hits, and they say nothing about what the extension contacts. Two real entries, api.statsigcdn.com (feature flags) and app.wascript.com, are service endpoints a CRM would call. With no host permissions declared, the extension cannot reach arbitrary sites anyway.
Total findings are 1184. Of those, 405 are the IoC entries above and 754 are code-smell hits, which fire on string concatenation, eval-adjacent patterns and bundled vendor code in any large JavaScript project. Zero malware signatures, zero malware-family matches, zero secrets and zero dependency findings. The severity split stops at medium; nothing is rated high or critical.
The two obfuscation findings deserve naming. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64-funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js:1 flags a base64 blob inside an asset under funnil/, and OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js:1 flags indirect function calls. Bundlers and minifiers emit both patterns routinely. Neither file carries a malware signature alongside the obfuscation, which is the combination that would turn this into a real finding.
A skeptic would point at that base64 asset plus a publisher identified only by an email address and a nine-user install base. That pairing is unusual for a CRM shipping a 7.4.x version number, and the blob has not been decoded. Fair. But a malicious verdict needs a specific capability or destination, and there is none here: no credential access, no search-engine replacement, no proxy routing, no signature match anywhere in 1184 findings. The volume explains the score, and one undecoded asset is worth another look rather than a takedown.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware-signature and zero malware-family matches across 1184 findings, including in the two files flagged for obfuscation
- The 405 IoC entries are misread CSS tokens and JS property chains (border.radius.circle, btn.glass, calls.function.arguments.delta) that do not resolve as hostnames
- All 22 network findings are socket.io, fetch and jQuery ajax calls in content/assets/js and background.js, the libraries a live chat-sync CRM needs
- 754 code-smell hits are the expected byproduct of bundled vendor JavaScript, and no finding is rated high or critical
- Manifest declares no permissions and no host_permissions, which caps what the extension can reach
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor reading CSS property tokens and JavaScript property chains as domain names
- Code-smell rules firing on minified and bundled vendor JavaScript
- socket.io and fetch calls that are inherent to a real-time chat CRM, not evidence of exfiltration
- base64 blob inside a bundled asset folder, a normal build artifact pattern
Reviewed 2026-10-11; recommended action: monitor; model confidence 72%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
14 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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