Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
SPEEDYX
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 5 days ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 F75…981
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is SPEEDYX safe?
SPEEDYX is a CRM that runs inside WhatsApp Web, adding labels, quick replies and chat organisation on top of the normal WhatsApp interface. It keeps a live socket connection and fetches from app.wascript.com, the service's own backend. The permission data we captured lists nothing special, which is unusual for an extension that draws inside WhatsApp, so the captured list probably has gaps.
Most of what the scanner flagged isn't about the extension's behaviour. The domain extractor pulled entries out of a bundled public suffix list, so above.sm, ae.jobs and af.pf turn up as if the extension contacted them. It also picked up CSS values such as border.radius.circle and btn.glass, and a JSON key called calls.function.arguments.delta. Files like content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28912.js trigger NET-SOCKET_IO and NET-FETCH matches because they open a connection and request data, which is how a chat CRM keeps messages in sync.
The scan's totals look big and mostly aren't. There are no malware signatures and no malware detections, and hundreds of code-quality rules that fire on any large JavaScript bundle. A base64 blob inside funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js is a bundled asset, the kind build tools inline all the time.
The part worth knowing: a WhatsApp CRM can read your conversations, and this one sends them through its own service. That is the deal the product makes. If you aren't comfortable with a small publisher, listed only as [email protected], handling chat data, skip it. The flags on the scorecard don't show it doing anything beyond its job.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | fluxo/assets/js/index.DUxSI4v-.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28976.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2898.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | crm/assets/js/2b070b0a-2c0f-4c9c-bb5b-938727270e32.CWg5n8f0.jscontent/assets/css/style.csscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289238.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | funnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jsfluxo/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | crm/index.jscrm/assets/js/modal.DGPvvr-c.jscrm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28911.jscrm/assets/css/style.csscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289166.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289237.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28937.jscrm/assets/js/index.COqP7WQ3.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289149.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jsfluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | crm/assets/js/index.CJ3d7GJf.jsfluxo/assets/js/useProcessIa.DaBdfAnN.jsfluxo/assets/js/showAudio.8rzWFlz_.js +169 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289148.jsfunnil/assets/ttf/Segoeuiitalic.chunk.ttfcontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289179.js +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28944.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | crm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289128.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28925.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289163.jswhatsapp/wpp/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289216.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | funnil/assets/js/2e0cf7f6-e9bc-41e0-84b5-f570a0e461c8.B8VBrnTG.jsfluxo/assets/css/style.cssfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.js +16 more | - |
Network Indicators
Concrete URLs, domains, IPs, emails, and hashes extracted from the analyzed artifact.
Loading network indicators
IoC detail rows are loaded outside the initial page render.
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
SPEEDYX describes itself as a CRM for WhatsApp Web, and the code in the bundle matches that pitch. The content scripts under content/assets/js/ open a live socket rather than only drawing a UI. Those vendor files carry build hashes in their names (v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28912.js, ...175.js, ...66.js), and the network findings inside them are ordinary: NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-JQUERY_AJAX, NET-FETCH. A chat CRM needs a persistent connection to sync conversations, so socket.io and fetch calls are the expected shape of this product. background.js:137 holds the one fetch that lives outside the content-script bundles.
Most of the endpoint list is not endpoints. above.sm, ae.jobs, ae.online, af.pf, be.audio and avatar.online are entries from a public suffix list bundled inside a URL or cookie library. border.radius.circle, btn.glass, artboard.phone and color.border.accent.orange are design tokens from a CSS-in-JS bundle. calls.function.arguments.delta is a key name from a streaming API response parser. These strings reach the indicator list because the extractor scans minified JavaScript for anything shaped like a domain. The 415 IoCs are this, repeated. None of it is a place the extension sends chat data.
The two obfuscation findings follow the same pattern. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js is an inline base64 asset inside a hashed build chunk, which is how bundlers embed fonts, icons and small images. OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js describes indirect function invocation, which every minifier emits when it renames a call site. Neither describes code written to hide from a reviewer.
Across all 1194 findings there are zero malware signatures, zero malware detections and zero credential-access findings. Seven hundred and fifty-four are code-smell rules (eval, weak randomness, string building) that fire on any large JavaScript codebase, and they match bundled dependencies under content/assets/js/ and funnil/assets/js/.
The strongest counterargument is real: SPEEDYX runs a content script against WhatsApp Web, so it can read every message in every conversation, and it ships that data over a socket to app.wascript.com. The publisher is listed only as an email address, [email protected], and the install base is 15 people, so there is no track record to lean on. That is a fair reason to weigh what the product is designed to do. It doesn't change what the scan actually found. Four hundred indicators and two obfuscation labels would matter if they pointed at a bank login page or a cookie store. Here they point at a public suffix list, a CSS theme and a webpack chunk.
What would change this verdict: a manifest requesting cookie, webRequest or tab-injection access beyond what a WhatsApp content script needs, or traffic to a domain that isn't the extension's own service. app.wascript.com is the only listed endpoint that belongs to a real service, and it is consistent with a CRM backend. Nothing else here supports a malicious reading.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware signatures and zero malware detections across 1194 findings, with 754 low-severity code-smell rules and 415 IoCs accounting for the volume.
- The endpoint list is dominated by non-domains: public suffix entries (above.sm, ae.jobs, be.audio), CSS tokens (border.radius.circle, btn.glass) and the parser key calls.function.arguments.delta, showing the extractor misread minified bundles.
- NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-JQUERY_AJAX and NET-FETCH matches sit in build-hashed vendor chunks under content/assets/js/, which is expected traffic for a real-time WhatsApp CRM.
- The obfuscation hits are OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in a hashed webpack chunk (funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-...CgnacD38.js) and FUNCTION_INDIRECT in a minified bundle, both build artifacts.
- app.wascript.com is the only endpoint belonging to a real service and is consistent with the product's own backend.
False Positive Considerations
- Public suffix list bundled in a URL library parsed as 415 IoC domains
- CSS-in-JS design tokens (border.radius.circle, btn.glass, color.border.accent.orange) read as network endpoints
- Minified vendor chunks under content/assets/js/ producing generic NET-FETCH, NET-SOCKET_IO and NET-JQUERY_AJAX matches
- 754 code-smell rules firing on bundled dependencies with no malware or credential findings
Reviewed 2026-10-13; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 75%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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