@raycast/api
The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (71/100) still counts them.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 3 weeks ago 28 October 2026
- Version
- v2.10.1
- Artifact
- SHA256 96943e2d…9a7901
- Detail
- Full list
Is @raycast/api safe?
@raycast/api is the library developers install to build Raycast extensions. Version 2.10.1 ships the React and Node helpers an extension imports, the type definitions in types/index.d.ts, and a command line publish tool under dist/commands/publish/. It declares no special permissions. The network calls it makes run through dist/api/raycast.js, dist/api/github.js and the login and profile commands, which exchange a Raycast account token with Raycast's own service and the GitHub API when you publish an extension to the store.
Two high-severity signature hits, both titled YARA--supply_chain_sourcemap_appended_iife, land at line 513 of dist/utils/publish/publish-to-store.js and dist/commands/publish/index.js. Read literally, that would mean someone bolted extra code onto the end of a shipped bundle, the usual way a tampered release hides a payload. What sits at that spot is the source map comment esbuild writes when it bundles those two publish scripts, and the map files ship in the same folder.
One critical label deserves naming: OBFUSCATION-INVISIBLE_TAGS_BLOCK-types/index.d.ts-0, for invisible Unicode tag characters at the start of the type declaration file. Those characters are the same trick people use to smuggle instructions into tool descriptions an AI reads. Here the file is only consumed by the TypeScript compiler for editor autocomplete, it never executes, and nothing pairs it with a network call or a secret read.
No tool-poisoning directives turned up, no reads of .ssh, .aws or .kube credentials, and no domains outside Raycast's own service and GitHub. The signatures fired on bundled build output, which is what the scanner inspected, not on anything the package does at run time.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
1 rule| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | supply chain sourcemap appended iife | 2 | dist/commands/publish/index.jsdist/utils/publish/publish-to-store.js | - |
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
1 rule(2 hits)AI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
What this package is
@raycast/api 2.10.1 is the official SDK for building Raycast extensions. It ships React and Node runtime helpers, TypeScript declarations in types/index.d.ts, and a publish command line tool under dist/commands/publish/. Releases go out through GitHub Actions automation, which is why the publisher field reads the way it does.
Tool poisoning
No tool-poisoning patterns matched. That fits what the code is: a library extension authors import. It defines no MCP tools and carries no agent-facing tool descriptions, so there is nothing here in the poisoning shape. Contrast this with SDKs that register tools with description: fields, where scanner hits are tool definitions rather than directives.
Credentials and network
Network matches sit in files whose names explain them: dist/commands/login/index.js, dist/commands/profile/index.js, dist/api/raycast.js, dist/api/github.js and dist/utils/publish/setup-github-fork.js. These are the account login, profile lookup, extension publishing and GitHub fork setup paths of the raycast CLI. None of them touch .ssh, .aws/credentials, .kube/config or application_default_credentials.json, and no domain outside Raycast's own service and the GitHub API turns up. The only credential the code handles is the Raycast account token used by raycast publish, which is the documented purpose of that command.
The two high-severity hits
YARA--supply_chain_sourcemap_appended_iife fired at dist/utils/publish/publish-to-store.js:513 and dist/commands/publish/index.js:513. The rule looks for an IIFE bundle with a sourcemap reference tacked onto the end, which is exactly the tail esbuild emits for these two bundled files. Both hits land on the same line in two build outputs of the same publish command. A real sourcemap injection appends foreign code, not a comment pointing at a map that ships in the same dist directory.
The one finding worth a second look
OBFUSCATION-INVISIBLE_TAGS_BLOCK-types/index.d.ts-0 flags Unicode tag-block characters at the head of the declaration file, and it carries a critical label. Tag characters are the mechanism behind hidden-instruction steganography in tool descriptions, so the hit is not meaningless. It also has no execution path: types/index.d.ts is read by the TypeScript compiler for autocomplete and never runs. Nothing in the package pairs it with a directive, a network call or a credential read.
The counterargument
Two supply-chain signatures plus a critical obfuscation label is the fingerprint of a rug-pulled release, and a publisher listed as GitHub Actions is normally a reason to slow down. Both point at build output with no reachable behavior: bundled publish tooling on one side, a declaration file on the other, and no reads of secret material anywhere in between. If those tag characters turned up in a file that executes, or in a description an agent consumes, the answer would change.
Key Reasons
- No tool-poisoning patterns matched; @raycast/api defines extension APIs for Raycast, not agent-facing MCP tool descriptions.
- Both YARA--supply_chain_sourcemap_appended_iife hits sit at line 513 of bundled publish CLI files, the esbuild sourcemap tail rather than injected code.
- Network activity is confined to Raycast's own service (dist/api/raycast.js), GitHub (dist/api/github.js) and the login/profile commands; no secret filesystem paths are read.
- OBFUSCATION-INVISIBLE_TAGS_BLOCK-types/index.d.ts-0 lands in a declaration file that never executes and is not paired with any directive or exfiltration call.
- Official Raycast SDK published through GitHub Actions release automation, with publish tooling bundled as IIFE output.
False Positive Considerations
- Supply-chain sourcemap YARA rule matching esbuild's appended sourceMappingURL comment in dist/ bundles
- Invisible Unicode tag-block match in a generated .d.ts declaration file with no runtime behavior
- NET-SOCKET_IO and NET-FETCH hits on every bundled CLI file that imports fetch or http
- Malware-signature matches on bundled build output rather than authored source
Reviewed 2026-10-30 · version 2.10.1; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 82%.
n8n version history
Risk trend by version
24 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.
Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.