Notepad++ Plugins

Markdown with Mermaid

4ff9cdf9-0ff2-5c89-a262-ffeae9ca48ea | Store v1.4.1
64/ 100
MEDIUM risk
AI review verdict
Review before use

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (64/100) still counts them.

Analysis record

Analysed
3 weeks ago 25 October 2026
Version
v1.4.1
Artifact
SHA256 2d377ace…0008d6
Detail
Full list

Is Markdown with Mermaid safe?

Markdown with Mermaid is a Notepad++ plugin that shows a live Markdown preview, draws Mermaid diagrams without a network connection, and exports your document or selection to HTML, PDF or DOCX. It needs the Microsoft Edge WebView2 Runtime to render that preview. The extension declares no special permissions and no host permissions, which fits a plugin that works with the file already open in the editor.

Two files carry the loudest labels. The scanner marked x86/WebView2Loader.dll and Markdown_with_Mermaid.dll as supply chain binaries. WebView2Loader.dll is Microsoft's own loader for the WebView2 runtime, and the second file is the plugin itself: Notepad++ plugins are native DLLs, so any scan of one reports a compiled binary with no readable source. A flag on assets/docx.iife.js points at the bundled DOCX export library, and the one on assets/vscode-slugify.js is a heading-slug helper that handles non-Latin alphabets, which is why that file holds so many Unicode characters. If either were a hidden payload, you would also see matching malware signatures or code that fetches and runs something. There are none.

The network list deserves a look because it is long and reads badly. It contains entries like console.info, which is a JavaScript logging call, emphasismarktype.dot, which is Markdown syntax for bold and italic text, 05-merlay-architecture.md, a document filename, and barnesandnoble.com. Those are text fragments pulled out of bundled JavaScript and documentation. None is a server the plugin contacts.

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

196 findings
Showing 25 of 69 · highest severity first

YARA Rule Matches

16 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
LOWpostinstall persistence mechanism 10
CHANGELOG.mdassets/mermaid.min.jsassets/markdown-it.min.js +7 more
-
LOWNoDisableSanitizeHtml 1
assets/viewer.js
-
LOWcredential env files 4
assets/highlight.min.jsassets/docx.iife.jsassets/markdown-it.min.js +1 more
-
LOWDebuggerStatementsShouldNotBeUsed 1
assets/highlight.min.js
-
LOWNoUseWeakRandom 2
assets/mermaid.min.jsassets/docx.iife.js
-
LOWpostinstall file download 16
assets/icons/SOURCE.mdassets/mermaid.min.jsassets/markdown-it.min.js +13 more
-
LOWSQLInjection 1
assets/highlight.min.js
-
LOWNoUseEval 1
assets/docx.iife.js
-
LOWpostinstall crypto operations 10
assets/viewer.jsassets/docx.iife.jslicenses/NOTICE-BundledDependencies.txt +7 more
-
LOWpostinstall network communication 26
assets/viewer.htmlassets/viewer.jsassets/mermaid.min.js +23 more
-
LOWpostinstall system command 21
docs/BUILD-WORKFLOW.ymlassets/docx.iife.jslicenses/LICENSE-Notepad++.txt +18 more
-
LOWpostinstall file manipulation 15
assets/purify.min.jsassets/selection.jsassets/docx-export.js +12 more
-
LOWOriginsNotVerified 1
assets/docx.iife.js
-
LOWpostinstall registry modification 5
assets/docx.iife.jslicenses/NOTICE-BundledDependencies.txtassets/highlight.min.js +2 more
-
LOWpostinstall obfuscation 12
assets/purify.min.jsassets/highlight.min.jsassets/markdown-it.min.js +9 more
-
LOWpostinstall environment access 1
licenses/NOTICE-BundledDependencies.txt
-

Finding Categories

4
Obfuscation
558
IoC Indicators

YARA Rules Matched

16 rules(127 hits)
postinstall persistence mechanism NoDisableSanitizeHtml credential env files DebuggerStatementsShouldNotBeUsed NoUseWeakRandom postinstall file download SQLInjection NoUseEval postinstall crypto operations postinstall network communication postinstall system command postinstall file manipulation OriginsNotVerified postinstall registry modification postinstall obfuscation postinstall environment access

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

Native Notepad++ plugins run inside the editor process, so the useful question is whether Markdown_with_Mermaid.dll does anything beyond rendering the file already open.

Live preview, offline Mermaid diagram rendering and export to HTML, PDF and DOCX are the advertised functions, and the code behind them matches. assets/docx.iife.js is the DOCX exporter shipped as a minified IIFE build. assets/vscode-slugify.js is a heading-slug helper that handles many writing systems, which is why it trips OBFUSCATION-unicode_heavy: the file carries a heavy load of non-Latin characters because transliteration is its job. OBFUSCATION-function_indirect on assets/docx.iife.js is the standard bundler indirection inside an immediately-invoked wrapper. Nothing in the scan records a shell command, an install-time hook, or a download-and-execute step.

Credential access is absent. No finding touches .env files, .git/config, SSH keys, cloud credential paths or a browser credential store, and the secret-scanning pass produced no matches at all. Both permissions and host_permissions are empty, which is expected for a Notepad++ plugin that has no manifest to declare them in. The plugin can read and write whatever the editor user can, because that is how in-process native plugins work.

The endpoint list is extraction noise. console.info is a JavaScript console call. emphasismarktype.dot is Markdown emphasis syntax. 05-merlay-architecture.md is a document filename and check-release-package.ps is a build script name. barnesandnoble.com, free.fr and beopen.com are ordinary registered domains that show up as substrings of bundled text. None is a plausible command-and-control host, and the malware-signature and network categories both came back empty.

The strongest counterargument is that two compiled DLLs cannot be read. OBFUSCATION-supply_chain_binary fired at critical severity on Markdown_with_Mermaid.dll and x86/WebView2Loader.dll, and a plugin embedding a Chromium view has a large JavaScript surface inside it. Two things defuse this. WebView2Loader.dll is Microsoft's redistributable loader, present in nearly every WebView2 application. That rule matches compiled PE files as a class, so it fires on any DLL regardless of behaviour, and the same scan found no packed payload, no second-stage download and no matching malware family. The JavaScript files behind the remaining flags, assets/docx.iife.js and assets/vscode-slugify.js, are readable library builds.

What would change this read is a source review of the plugin DLL or runtime monitoring of its outbound calls. On the evidence present, the flags come from binary-format rules and domain extraction, and the plugin does what its description says.

Key Reasons

  • No malware signature, secret, dependency or network finding anywhere in the scan; the volume is domain extraction plus low-severity code-smell rules on bundled JavaScript
  • OBFUSCATION-supply_chain_binary fires on compiled PE files as a class, and one of the two files hit is Microsoft's redistributable x86/WebView2Loader.dll
  • The other obfuscation hits are readable library builds: assets/docx.iife.js (minified IIFE exporter) and assets/vscode-slugify.js (Unicode slug helper)
  • Extracted endpoints are JavaScript method names, Markdown syntax and document filenames ('console.info', 'emphasismarktype.dot', '05-merlay-architecture.md') rather than attacker infrastructure
  • File read/write and in-process execution are inherent to a native Notepad++ plugin that previews and exports the open document

False Positive Considerations

  • OBFUSCATION-supply_chain_binary matching any compiled DLL, including Microsoft's WebView2Loader.dll
  • IoC extractor reading JavaScript calls and Markdown syntax as hostnames ('console.info', 'emphasismarktype.dot')
  • Minified bundled libraries in assets/ triggering obfuscation and code-smell rules by design
  • No matching malware signature, secret or network finding to substantiate any of the flags

Reviewed 2026-10-28 · version 1.4.1; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 78%.

Frequently Asked Questions