MCP Registry

@mseep/mobile-mcp

5a35d838-f893-5283-8908-9c5bbd8524dd | Store v0.0.12
64/ 100
MEDIUM risk
AI review verdict
Review before use

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (64/100) still counts them.

Analysis record

Analysed
7 months ago 23 April 2026
Version
v0.0.12
Artifact
SHA256 9c012224…a1dfab
Detail
Full list

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

48 findings

YARA Rule Matches

9 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
HIGHpostinstall file download

File download activity detected

2
README.mdlib/webdriver-agent.js
Risky Plugins Authors FP 30%
HIGHpostinstall obfuscation

Code obfuscation techniques detected

2
README.mdlib/server.js
Risky Plugins Authors FP 20%
HIGHcredential env files

Environment configuration file path detected

3
lib/logger.jslib/android.jslib/ios.js
Risky Plugins Authors FP 10%
HIGHpostinstall network communication

Network communication detected

7
lib/webdriver-agent.jslib/index.jsREADME.md +4 more
Risky Plugins Authors FP 30%
HIGHpostinstall file manipulation

File system manipulation detected

4
lib/webdriver-agent.jspackage.jsonlib/ios.js +1 more
Risky Plugins Authors FP 20%
HIGHUsingShellInterpreterWhenExecutingOSCommands

Arbitrary OS command injection vulnerabilities are more likely when a shell is spawned rather than a new process, indeed shell meta-chars can be used (when parameters are user-controlled for instance) to inject OS commands. For more information checkout the CWE-78 (https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html) advisory.

1
lib/iphone-simulator.js
FP 10%
HIGHpostinstall system command

System command execution detected

4
LICENSElib/android.jslib/ios.js +1 more
Risky Plugins Authors FP 10%
HIGHNoUseSocketManually

Sockets are vulnerable in multiple ways: They enable a software to interact with the outside world. As this world is full of attackers it is necessary to check that they cannot receive sensitive information or inject dangerous input.The number of sockets is limited and can be exhausted. Which makes the application unresponsive to users who need additional sockets. In many cases there is no need to open a socket yourself. Use instead libraries and existing protocols For more information checkout the CWE-20 (https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html) advisory.

1
lib/ios.js
FP 20%
HIGHpostinstall crypto operations

Cryptographic operations detected

1
lib/ios.js
Risky Plugins Authors FP 30%

Finding Categories

25
Malware Signatures
10
Network

YARA Rules Matched

9 rules(25 hits)
postinstall file download postinstall obfuscation credential env files postinstall network communication postinstall file manipulation UsingShellInterpreterWhenExecutingOSCommands postinstall system command NoUseSocketManually postinstall crypto operations

MCP Server Analysis

MCP servers expose tools and resources to AI assistants. Unlike browser extensions, they run as standalone processes with direct system access. Tool definitions are analyzed for prompt injection, data exfiltration, and tool poisoning patterns.

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

Tool Poisoning Assessment

The scanner detected zero tool-poisoning findings for @mseep/mobile-mcp. This is the most critical security indicator for MCP packages. Tool poisoning—the defining threat to MCP servers—involves hidden AI manipulation directives embedded in tool descriptions. The absence of any tool-poisoning findings means no hidden instructions like "do not tell the user," "silently execute," or XML-style directive tags were found in tool metadata. The findings_summary explicitly shows "tool-poisoning":"0".

Credential and Network Access

No credential-access findings were detected. The findings_summary shows "secret":"0" with no credential-access findings targeting sensitive paths like .ssh/, .aws/credentials, .kube/config, or environment variables containing secret names (GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.). This is a strong indicator that the package does not harvest credentials.

Network findings show 10 NET-FETCH detections in lib/webdriver-agent.js at lines 15, 25, 37, 50, 62, 87, 102, 158, 168, and 186. These are generic fetch calls without associated XIOC findings pointing to suspicious domains. The file name webdriver-agent.js aligns with the package's stated purpose as a "Mobile MCP" server—webdriver agents legitimately make HTTP requests to communicate with mobile device emulators or browser automation services. The absence of IoC findings ("ioc":"0" in findings_summary) confirms no suspicious domains or IPs were detected.

Malware Signature Findings

The 25 malware-signature findings (27 high severity total) are YARA code-smell rules firing on normal JavaScript patterns. The distinction between "malware-signature":"25" and "malware":"0" indicates signature matches without confirmed malicious behavior. YARA rules like postinstall_*, credential_*, and code-quality rules commonly trigger false positives on legitimate Node.js code that uses standard libraries (fetch, fs, process.env).

Strongest Counterargument

The 27 high-severity findings could suggest malicious code. However, severity scores in CVEQ are inflated by signature match counts, not behavioral evidence. The absence of tool-poisoning, credential-access, and IoC findings—the three indicators of actual MCP threats—demonstrates these are false positives. The network activity in lib/webdriver-agent.js is consistent with the package's mobile webdriver purpose, not exfiltration architecture.

Conclusion

This package shows no evidence of the defining MCP threats: no tool poisoning, no credential harvesting, no suspicious network destinations. The findings are consistent with YARA code-smell false positives on legitimate mobile automation code.

Key Reasons

  • Zero tool-poisoning findings (defining MCP threat is absent)
  • Zero credential/secret access findings
  • Zero IoC findings (no suspicious domains or IPs)
  • Network calls in webdriver-agent.js align with stated mobile MCP purpose
  • Malware signatures are YARA code-smell false positives on normal JavaScript

False Positive Considerations

  • YARA malware-signature rules firing on legitimate JavaScript code
  • Network findings from webdriver-agent.js are expected for mobile MCP functionality
  • High severity counts from signature matches rather than behavioral evidence

Reviewed 2026-04-27; recommended action: no action; model confidence 85%.

Source Code Viewer

Source Code Not Available

Source code is not available for this version of the extension.

About This Extension

Mobile MCP

Frequently Asked Questions