Notepad++ Plugins

Graph Builder

5a98a7cb-3af5-5016-8eb3-79fdc89ce61f | Store v1.3.9
64/ 100
MEDIUM risk
No change since v1.3.7
AI review verdict
Review before use

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (64/100) still counts them.

Analysis record

Analysed
1 month ago 9 October 2026
Version
v1.3.9
Artifact
SHA256 d293c56c…1a538d
Detail
Full list

Is Graph Builder safe?

Graph Builder is a plugin for Notepad++ that plots the formula under your cursor and fits a formula to pasted data. Notepad++ plugins are Windows DLLs loaded straight into the editor, and this one ships two of them, GraphBuilderLaz.dll and WebView2Loader.dll, the second being Microsoft's standard loader for the WebView2 runtime named in the plugin's own description. The plugin declares no special permissions. The only network addresses that hold up are pisarev.github.io, the developer's GitHub Pages site, and www.inkscape.org, the open source vector editor, which fits a plugin that draws graphs.

The scanner's two serious hits are titled OBFUSCATION-supply_chain_binary, one on GraphBuilderLaz.dll:0 and one on WebView2Loader.dll:0. Taken literally, that would mean someone shipped a Windows library with its insides compressed and its symbols stripped to hide what it does. It is also what an ordinary release build of a native program looks like, and WebView2Loader.dll is the unmodified Microsoft file that ships with plenty of desktop apps.

The long list of network addresses is mostly not addresses. Names like drag.cx, drag.cy, view.cx, view.cy and location.search come from the plotting panel's own JavaScript, where they are property lookups on objects, and the scanner read them as web domains. No malware signature matched, nothing reads .env files or SSH keys, and there is no endpoint that could carry your files anywhere. The plugin reads the document you have open and the text you paste, which is what it needs to draw the graph.

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

25 findings

YARA Rule Matches

9 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
LOWpostinstall crypto operations 1
ui/index.html
-
LOWpostinstall file manipulation 3
WebView2Loader.dllui/index.htmlsyntax.xml
-
LOWpostinstall registry modification 2
INSTALL.txtsyntax.xml
-
LOWpostinstall obfuscation 2
ui/index.htmlsyntax.xml
-
LOWpostinstall network communication 2
WebView2Loader.dllui/index.html
-
LOWpostinstall system command 3
WebView2Loader.dllui/index.htmlsyntax.xml
-
LOWLocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed 1
ui/index.html
-
LOWpostinstall file download 2
INSTALL.txtui/index.html
-
LOWpostinstall persistence mechanism 2
WebView2Loader.dllui/index.html
-

Network Indicators

Concrete URLs, domains, IPs, emails, and hashes extracted from the analyzed artifact.

46 total

Loading network indicators

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Finding Categories

2
Obfuscation
46
IoC Indicators

YARA Rules Matched

9 rules(18 hits)
postinstall crypto operations postinstall file manipulation postinstall registry modification postinstall obfuscation postinstall network communication postinstall system command LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed postinstall file download postinstall persistence mechanism

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

Graph Builder is a Notepad++ plugin that plots the formula under the cursor and fits a formula to pasted data. It ships as two native DLLs, GraphBuilderLaz.dll and WebView2Loader.dll, which is the normal shape for this ecosystem. Notepad++ loads plugins in-process as Windows libraries, and the panel is rendered by the WebView2 runtime named in the extension's own description. Document and clipboard access is the whole job here: there is no separate spawn step to flag, because a native plugin already runs inside the editor process.

The only high-severity findings are two OBFUSCATION-supply_chain_binary hits, on GraphBuilderLaz.dll:0 and WebView2Loader.dll:0. Both are compiled Windows binaries. Release builds of native code compress their sections and strip symbols, and binary heuristics read that as hiding something. The finding describes the shape of a linker output, not behavior. WebView2Loader.dll is Microsoft's own redistributable loader, shipped unmodified alongside countless desktop apps that embed a browser view. The Laz suffix points at Lazarus/Free Pascal, a routine toolchain for small Windows utilities.

The 46 network findings shrink to almost nothing on inspection. Entries such as button.pf, drag.cx, drag.cy, view.cx, view.cy, location.search and window.chrome are JavaScript property accesses in the webview panel's plotting code, pulled out as if they were hostnames. Two real domains appear: www.inkscape.org, the open source vector editor, consistent with icon or asset handling, and pisarev.github.io, the developer's own GitHub Pages site, the usual home for plugin documentation or a version check. There is no analytics host, no paste service, no unknown endpoint.

On credentials, the record is empty. No finding references .env, .ssh, .git/config, cloud credential files, or any editor credential store, and none of the observed endpoints could carry such content anywhere. The remaining entries are 18 code-smell items at low severity, the kind that fire on nearly any JavaScript webview, plus five informational notes.

The strongest counterargument is that native plugin DLLs get far less review than JavaScript, and a hostile Notepad++ plugin would look much like this from the outside: no manifest to declare intent, no permission gate, full in-process reach. That argument only holds if the behavior is invisible. A hostile build would still have to show a download-and-execute stage, a suspicious host, or a read of a secrets file somewhere in the evidence. None of those are present. What is present is a compiled binary and a list of misparsed identifiers.

Key Reasons

  • Both high-severity hits are OBFUSCATION-supply_chain_binary on compiled DLLs, one of which (WebView2Loader.dll) is Microsoft's unmodified WebView2 loader
  • 46 IoC entries such as drag.cx, view.cy, button.pf and location.search are JavaScript property accesses from the webview panel, not hostnames
  • The two real domains found, pisarev.github.io and www.inkscape.org, are the developer's own docs site and a well-known open source project
  • Zero secret findings, zero malware signatures, zero network findings, and no malware family match
  • A Notepad++ plugin shipping native DLLs and reading the open document matches its stated purpose of plotting formulas

False Positive Considerations

  • Binary/obfuscation heuristic firing on ordinary compiled and packed release DLLs
  • IoC extractor reading JavaScript property chains (drag.cx, view.cy, button.pf) as domain names
  • Code-smell rules counting 18 low-severity hits from the bundled webview JavaScript
  • Native Notepad++ plugin architecture means no manifest permissions to correlate with behavior

Reviewed 2026-10-12 · version 1.3.9; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 82%.

Notepad++ version history

Risk trend by version

5 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.

Selected
64
Change since first
-8
Change from previous
No change
Versions:
First analyzed version
1.3.2
First seen Aug 21, 2026
Risk range
64 to 73
Across analyzed versions
Latest analyzed version
1.3.9
First seen Oct 9, 2026
Selected version
medium
Version
v1.3.9
First seen 1 month ago
Risk score
64
Findings
71
Change vs previous
No change

Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.

Frequently Asked Questions