Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
Master Engage
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 1 weeks ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 672…377
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is Master Engage safe?
Master Engage adds CRM features to WhatsApp Web: contact lists, labels and message templates. The manifest we captured declares no permissions and no host permissions, which is unusual for an extension that works by injecting scripts into a site. Its code sits in content scripts under content/assets/js/ plus a background.js service worker, and the one endpoint clearly tied to the vendor is app.wascript.com. Most of the other entries listed as domains are not domains at all. border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange and btn.glass are CSS token names, and calls.function.arguments.delta is a property chain from a streaming helper.
The findings that read as alarming are routine traffic. NET-SOCKET_IO in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289149.js marks a Socket.IO client, and NET-FETCH in background.js:137 marks an HTTP call. A CRM that syncs your contacts and templates has to talk to a server, so those matches tell you the extension makes network requests and little else. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 at funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js:1 sits in a file named with a build-tool suffix, the place embedded icons and fonts end up. OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js:1 fires on a pattern that minifiers produce everywhere.
The scanner counted 754 code-quality matches and 421 extracted indicators. Those totals come from the size of the bundle: every bundled library contributes its own entries, so a normal packaged app reaches four figures without anything wrong. No malware signature matched, and nothing in the code points at logins, cookies or message theft. The one thing the data does not show is the declared permission list, so the scope the extension asks for on install is unknown. If the manifest turns out to request broad site access, that is the detail worth checking.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289216.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289119.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289163.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | fluxo/assets/css/style.csscrm/assets/js/22224ae4-c9a0-456b-97d3-6f47a43e6f69.cO50aLre.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289128.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289128.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jscrm/index.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | fluxo/assets/js/b89d7b82-41f7-4061-9bc0-ae95ae5cd0a2.BLiJgZ4E.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jsfunnil/assets/ttf/Segoeuibolditalic.chunk.ttf +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | whatsapp/wpp/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2894.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | fluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2899.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28983.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28939.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28930.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | fluxo/assets/js/b89d7b82-41f7-4061-9bc0-ae95ae5cd0a2.BLiJgZ4E.jsfunnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jsfluxo/index.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28939.jsfunnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28958.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | crm/assets/js/modal.CMbmE-rI.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.jswhatsapp/wpp_module/index.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | fluxo/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289148.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289175.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28985.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289265.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289143.js +169 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
Master Engage is a Chrome extension that layers CRM tools onto WhatsApp Web: contact organisation, chat labels and reusable message templates, according to its own description. To do that it injects content scripts into the WhatsApp page, which is why the scanner spent its time inside a versioned bundle under content/assets/js/ and a background.js service worker.
The network findings describe ordinary client-to-server traffic. NET-FETCH-background.js:137 marks an HTTP call from the service worker. NET-SOCKET_IO-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289149.js:64 marks a Socket.IO client. NET-JQUERY_AJAX-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28923.js:13 marks jQuery's Ajax helper. A CRM that keeps contacts and templates in sync needs a live channel and a request layer, so all three fit the stated job.
The endpoint list is where the noise shows. app.wascript.com is the one host tied to the product. border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange and btn.glass are CSS design-token names, not domains. calls.function.arguments.delta is a JavaScript property chain from a streaming helper. above.sm, below.sm, ae.jobs and af.pf are fragments pulled out of minified strings. The Atlassian entries and api.statsigcdn.com belong to bundled libraries (design system and feature-flag SDK) rather than to the extension's own code.
Both obfuscation matches have plain explanations. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64-funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js:1 sits in a file whose name is a UUID plus a build suffix, the naming bundlers produce. Large Base64 blocks there hold embedded assets such as icons, fonts or source maps. OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js:1 is a heuristic for indirect function calls, a normal product of minification. Neither is a malware signature, and the scan recorded zero malware-signature and zero malware-family matches.
The 421 IoC entries and 754 code-quality findings measure bundle size as much as anything else. Each bundled npm module emits its own matches, so a hundred small libraries produce thousands of entries. No finding names a login domain, a cookie-harvesting routine or a session-token endpoint.
A sceptic's strongest point is that an extension running inside WhatsApp Web can read every conversation, and the manifest in this capture lists no permissions and no host permissions, so the declared scope is not visible. That gap is real, and it is worth resolving. The verdict holds because it rests on what the code contains: fetch, Socket.IO and Ajax plumbing pointed at the vendor's own host, with nothing in the rule set for stealing messages or credentials. A manifest granting broad host access, or a request target outside app.wascript.com, would change the picture.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware-signature and zero malware-family findings across 1200 results; the highest severity present is medium.
- Network findings (NET-FETCH background.js:137, NET-SOCKET_IO ...89149.js:64, NET-JQUERY_AJAX ...8923.js:13) match the stated job of syncing a CRM with a backend.
- The endpoint list mixes real hosts (app.wascript.com) with extraction garbage: border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange and btn.glass are CSS tokens, calls.function.arguments.delta is a property chain.
- Both obfuscation matches (LARGE_BASE64 in a UUID-named build artifact, FUNCTION_INDIRECT in a minified bundle) are standard bundler output.
- No IoC names a login domain, cookie endpoint or session-token routine.
False Positive Considerations
- Minified/bundled webpack output under content/assets/js/ producing 754 code-smell matches across hundreds of modules
- XIOC extractor reading CSS design-token names and JS property chains as domains
- NET-FETCH / NET-JQUERY_AJAX / NET-SOCKET_IO matching normal client-to-backend sync traffic
- LARGE_BASE64 matched against embedded assets inside a hashed build artifact
Reviewed 2026-10-11; recommended action: monitor; model confidence 72%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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