Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
WaClinic
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 4 days ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 047…80E
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is WaClinic safe?
WaClinic is a CRM add-on for WhatsApp Web. It organizes chats and adds business tooling on top of the WhatsApp interface, which it does with content scripts injected into pages plus a background service worker that talks to the vendor's own server at app.wascript.com. It also loads Statsig (api.statsigcdn.com), a feature-flag and analytics service used by many apps. The manifest as scanned lists no permissions and no host permissions.
The most alarming-looking results are the network findings. Titles like NET-SOCKET_IO and NET-JQUERY_AJAX in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_*.js and background.js mean the extension ships Socket.IO, jQuery's AJAX helper and the browser's fetch API. For a tool that keeps a live chat session in sync with a server, those are the expected building blocks rather than a sign of data going somewhere strange.
Two obfuscation hits show up, OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js and OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in content/assets/js/...260.js. A big base64 string in a bundled asset is usually an inlined image, font or source map, and indirect function calls come from bundler output. No malware signature matched anywhere in the scan.
The volume behind all of this comes from the scanner. It logged hundreds of code-smell matches that fire on any minified JavaScript, and it read strings like border.radius.circle and color.border.accent.orange out of the code as if they were internet domains. Those are CSS values. If you want a reason to stay wary, the developer is an email address and the extension has only about 21 users. That is thin public history, not evidence of harmful code.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.jsfluxo/assets/js/b89d7b82-41f7-4061-9bc0-ae95ae5cd0a2.BLiJgZ4E.jsfluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.js +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28914.jscrm/assets/js/2b070b0a-2c0f-4c9c-bb5b-938727270e32.CWg5n8f0.jsfluxo/assets/js/b89d7b82-41f7-4061-9bc0-ae95ae5cd0a2.BLiJgZ4E.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28924.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28927.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289265.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289145.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289208.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289200.jscrm/assets/css/style.csscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2893.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | fluxo/assets/js/index.BN-p9b24.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289265.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289143.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289257.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2899.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28958.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | funnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jscrm/assets/js/b3c3d2a2-f432-4ecd-a3f4-0b4582cc4a6c.B8_nURbH.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289195.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28958.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289166.jsfunnil/assets/js/1d2bb46d-fc90-4d3e-913e-6de868f5b92e.DeRmtv56.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | crm/assets/js/index.zzn1EYNa.jscrm/assets/js/index.B6c6aVcv.jsfluxo/assets/js/index.DUxSI4v-.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | fluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289175.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | crm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28952.jsfluxo/index.js +169 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
WaClinic describes itself as a CRM for WhatsApp Web, and its file layout matches that job. There is a background.js, a content/assets/js/ tree of versioned bundles, and a second bundle directory called funnil/assets/js/. Version 7.4.3.87 ships on the Chrome Web Store to about 21 users under the developer address [email protected].
The scanner produced 1,204 findings. None of them are malware. That number is the first thing to understand: 754 are code-smell hits, the kind that fire on any minified bundle, and 425 are indicator-of-compromise extractions. The endpoint list shows why the second number carries no weight here. Alongside two real hosts, app.wascript.com and api.statsigcdn.com, the extractor lists border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange, btn.glass, above.sm, ae.jobs and calls.function.arguments.delta. Those are JavaScript property chains and design-token names, not domains anyone can connect to.
The 22 network findings tell the same story. Each one is a generic library detection: NET-JQUERY_AJAX, NET-SOCKET_IO and NET-FETCH, spread across content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_*.js and one instance in background.js:137. Socket.IO and fetch are what a chat tool uses to keep a WhatsApp session in sync with a server. jQuery's AJAX helper is bundled into thousands of store extensions. Nothing in those findings names an unknown host or an outbound data sink.
Two obfuscation findings exist. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 sits in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js, and OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in content/assets/js/...260.js. A large base64 blob inside a bundled asset is normally an inlined image, font or source map. Indirect function calls are how bundlers and module loaders operate. Neither coincides with a malware signature, and this scan matched none.
The strongest case against this verdict is the publisher. [email protected] is an email address rather than a company, and 21 installs is small enough that nobody has stress-tested the extension in public. Add an opaque filename like 9cf42769-...CgnacD38.js and a reader has fair reason to ask who is behind it. That doubt is aimed at the publisher, though, and the code itself shows nothing: no exfiltration target, no credential-harvesting pattern, no matched malware rule, no exposed secrets. A thin trust signal does not turn library detections into harmful behavior.
What would change the picture: a permission request that does not fit a chat CRM, a network finding pointing at a host outside app.wascript.com or a standard analytics provider, or a malware signature co-located with one of those two obfuscation hits in the same file. None of that is in this scan.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware signatures and zero secret findings across 1,204 total findings.
- All 22 network findings are generic library detections (NET-JQUERY_AJAX, NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-FETCH) in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_*.js and background.js:137, with no named external host.
- The endpoint list mixes two real hosts (app.wascript.com, its own backend, and api.statsigcdn.com, a feature-flag service) with property-chain and CSS-token artifacts such as border.radius.circle and btn.glass.
- Both obfuscation findings are common bundler artifacts: a large base64 blob in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-...CgnacD38.js and an indirect function call in content/assets/js/...260.js.
- Stated purpose (WhatsApp Web CRM) matches the file layout of content scripts plus a background service worker, with no category mismatch.
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor misreading JavaScript property chains and CSS design tokens (border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange, btn.glass, above.sm) as network domains.
- Generic library network rules (NET-JQUERY_AJAX, NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-FETCH) firing on bundled jQuery, Socket.IO and fetch calls in content scripts and background.js.
- 754 code-smell findings and 425 IoC extractions with no malware signatures, inflating volume without adding evidence.
- LARGE_BASE64 and FUNCTION_INDIRECT patterns flagging minified or asset-embedded third-party bundle output.
Reviewed 2026-10-15; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 75%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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