Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
WORKZAP
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 1 weeks ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 BE0…EF4
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is WORKZAP safe?
WORKZAP is a Chrome extension that adds a customer relationship workspace, and what we scanned is version 7.4.3.87 with content scripts plus a background script that calls fetch from background.js line 137. The manifest snapshot shows no host permissions and no API permissions, a strange fit for something that talks to a server, so that gap is probably how the scan read the file rather than a rule the extension set for itself.
The bulk of what the scanner turned up is network pattern matches. NET-FETCH, NET-SOCKET_IO and NET-JQUERY_AJAX show up across the content script chunks and in background.js. They tell you the extension opens connections. They do not tell you where those connections go, and a CRM keeping a live session with its backend will trip every one of them. The hostnames that look alarming in the list, things like btn.glass, above.sm and calls.function.arguments.delta, are not websites at all. They are fragments of minified code that the extractor read as domains. The real hosts are api.statsigcdn.com for feature flags, some Atlassian developer APIs, and app.wascript.com, the vendor's own service.
Two findings are worth naming rather than waving away. A large base64 block sits in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js, and indirect function calls sit in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js. Big base64 strings in a JavaScript assets folder are usually inlined images or fonts, and minifiers produce indirect calls on their own. Nothing in the output shows credentials being read or data being sent somewhere new.
What makes this look like scanner noise is the mix: 754 of the findings are low-severity style rules that fire on any bundled JavaScript, and hundreds more are code fragments misread as addresses. No malware signature, no credential access and no known bad endpoint matched anything here.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289237.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jscrm/assets/js/b15575b9-e8eb-4d64-83b8-37d47f2b0b0a.BbRllemT.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289200.jsfluxo/assets/css/style.csscrm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jsbackground.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289188.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | whatsapp/wpp/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28935.jsfunnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | fluxo/assets/js/b89d7b82-41f7-4061-9bc0-ae95ae5cd0a2.BLiJgZ4E.jsfunnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jsfluxo/index.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.jscrm/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289136.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289257.jsfunnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jsfluxo/index.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | funnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jscrm/assets/js/index.B6c6aVcv.jsfluxo/index.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | funnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289175.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289141.jscrm/assets/js/index.DCTZnrKF.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28984.js +169 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.jsfunnil/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289137.js +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | crm/index.jscrm/assets/js/b3c3d2a2-f432-4ecd-a3f4-0b4582cc4a6c.B8_nURbH.jscrm/assets/js/9dad81b5-b157-4788-80f8-467ec81980f7.Da0m4lTf.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | crm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.js +12 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
WORKZAP is a Chrome CRM client at version 7.4.3.87, published by [email protected] and installed by four users. The manifest snapshot lists no host permissions and no API permissions, while the code itself ships content scripts and a background.js that calls fetch at line 137. What follows is 1,188 findings, and their shape matters far more than their total.
Start with what is missing. No malware signature matched. No malware family matched. No secret was lifted from the bundle. No tool-poisoning indicator fired. In a package this size, that absence is the most useful thing in the set.
The 22 network findings are patterns rather than destinations. NET-FETCH appears in background.js:137 and across a long run of content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-*.js chunks. NET-SOCKET_IO appears in four of the same chunks, and NET-JQUERY_AJAX in two. A CRM that holds a live link to its backend uses sockets and fetch. These hits say the code talks to a server, which is the product's job. Not one of them names an endpoint worth flagging.
The endpoint list is where the extractor comes apart. border.radius.circle, btn.glass, color.border.accent.orange, calls.function.arguments.delta, above.sm and below.sm are not hosts. They are property chains and design-token strings pulled out of minified JavaScript. Of the hostnames that do exist, api.statsigcdn.com serves feature flags, api.dev.atlassian.com and api.stg.atlassian.com are Atlassian's own developer APIs, and app.wascript.com is the vendor's application host. None of these is a collection point.
The 754 code-smell findings are the same problem at scale. Those rules match ordinary JavaScript: eval-adjacent patterns, randomness calls, environment variable reads. Every bundled dependency triggers its own set, and the count multiplies.
That leaves the two obfuscation findings, which are the honest case against calling this clean. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 points at funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js, and OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT points at content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js. A large base64 string inside an assets/js folder is normally an inlined font, sprite or icon set, and indirect calls are what minifiers emit. Normally is doing real work in that sentence. Decoding the blob in the funnil chunk would settle it; until then it stays an open thread.
A skeptic would point at the publisher. An email at a domain called extensao.store, no company name, four users, and chunk files named with UUIDs and a version string. That is the profile of a throwaway upload. It is also the profile of a small shop shipping a niche CRM, and a file listing cannot separate the two. What the findings can say is narrower and more useful: nothing in this bundle reads credentials, matches a malware signature, or reports to an endpoint that is not a recognised service or the vendor's own host. Suspicion about who published it is not evidence about what it does.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware-signature, malware, secret and tool-poisoning matches across 1,188 findings
- All 22 network findings are protocol patterns (NET-FETCH, NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-JQUERY_AJAX) rather than suspicious endpoints
- The endpoint list is dominated by extractor artifacts such as border.radius.circle, btn.glass and calls.function.arguments.delta
- Named hosts resolve to legitimate services (api.statsigcdn.com, api.dev.atlassian.com) or the vendor's own app.wascript.com
- 754 of 1,188 findings are low-severity code-smell rules that fire on any bundled JavaScript
False Positive Considerations
- 754 low-severity code-smell findings from bundled/minified JavaScript
- 409 IoC entries including property chains and CSS design tokens misparsed as domains
- Network findings are protocol detections (fetch, socket.io, XHR), not endpoint detections
- High finding count in hashed bundle chunks creates multiplicative per-file matches
Reviewed 2026-10-10; recommended action: monitor; model confidence 70%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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