Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
Talk Mais
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- Yesterday
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 C21…141
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is Talk Mais safe?
Talk Mais is a CRM tool for WhatsApp Web: it adds contact and chat organisation on top of your existing WhatsApp account. The manifest data we captured lists no permissions and no host permissions, which would normally mean a quiet extension, though a tool that works inside WhatsApp Web has to declare site access somewhere and this scan did not capture it. Most of the network entries found in the code are not real hosts. Values like border.radius.circle, btn.glass and calls.function.arguments.delta are CSS style names and API field names the scanner read as web addresses. The genuine ones include api.statsigcdn.com, a common feature-flag service, and app.wascript.com, which fits a WhatsApp automation backend.
The findings that look alarming are the ones we can explain. Twenty-two network hits, with titles like NET-FETCH-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_86_085ff17f-7684-4a41-bfdd-8bd9d5293bb2234.js-1 and NET-SOCKET_IO-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_86_085ff17f-7684-4a41-bfdd-8bd9d5293bb212.js-15, record that a bundled file uses fetch, jQuery AJAX or a Socket.IO client. A chat tool that syncs with a server has to do exactly that. If any of those calls reached an address unrelated to the product, that would matter. None of the twenty-two names a destination tied to credential collection or a login page.
The scanner also flagged OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/ed6113f2-bc09-4421-a453-bbbd66fe9488.DCssQ7AT.js. That is a block of base64-encoded data inside a bundled file, and it is the one thing worth someone's time to unpack. Everything else that pushed the count up, hundreds of indicator entries and code-style warnings, is the kind of output any minified webpack bundle produces. The extension has 29 users and its developer contact is a plain email address, so there is little track record to lean on, just a scan that matched packaging patterns rather than behaviour.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289145.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289237.jscrm/index.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | crm/assets/js/22224ae4-c9a0-456b-97d3-6f47a43e6f69.cO50aLre.jsfluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.jscrm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | funnil/assets/ttf/Segoeuiitalic.chunk.ttfwhatsapp/wpp/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289137.js +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | crm/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jswhatsapp/wpp/index.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | crm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.jsfluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289128.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289110.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28987.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28972.jscrm/assets/js/2b070b0a-2c0f-4c9c-bb5b-938727270e32.CWg5n8f0.jscrm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.jsfunnil/assets/js/770d23cd-9021-4aef-887e-d47811b5c322.B8_nURbH.jsfluxo/index.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28939.jscrm/assets/js/modal.CMbmE-rI.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28929.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | crm/assets/js/81588378-4894-485b-a1a7-52b1571a56a9.B9qdt_GQ.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289221.jsfluxo/assets/js/5181be2f-1174-4183-97f1-b7530a9ad338.DdaECTgj.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28927.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289170.jsfluxo/assets/js/5181be2f-1174-4183-97f1-b7530a9ad338.DdaECTgj.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289175.jsfunnil/assets/js/68038811-0075-484f-8b19-297df42f51e1.CVYXH02z.jsfluxo/assets/js/aacac57f-f9a2-4a7d-9569-51c193124758.BUttUo7e.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28928.jscrm/assets/js/b15575b9-e8eb-4d64-83b8-37d47f2b0b0a.BbRllemT.jsfunnil/assets/js/comp.D8MS4w5d.js +169 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
Talk Mais presents itself as a CRM layered on top of WhatsApp Web, and the files in the extension match that description. The scan produced 1,200 entries sorting into three buckets: 421 indicator entries, 754 code-style warnings, and 24 hits across the network, obfuscation and manifest categories. The scan matched zero malware signatures and zero malware rules. Nothing in the credential, dependency, secret or tool-poisoning categories fired either.
The 22 network findings are usage detections rather than destinations. Titles such as NET-FETCH-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_86_085ff17f-7684-4a41-bfdd-8bd9d5293bb2260.js-1 and NET-SOCKET_IO-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_86_085ff17f-7684-4a41-bfdd-8bd9d5293bb2148.js-64 record that a file calls fetch, opens a Socket.IO connection, or issues a jQuery AJAX request. Those calls sit in version-stamped, hashed files under content/assets/js/, which is the shape of a webpack build. A CRM that syncs conversations with a server needs all three.
The endpoint list is where the extraction visibly drifts. border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange, btn.glass and calls.function.arguments.delta are CSS design tokens and streaming API field names that were lifted out of source text and recorded as hosts. The same is true of above.sm, below.sm, ae.jobs, af.pf, be.audio, avatar.online, artboard.phone and chat.live. The hosts that resolve to something real are api.statsigcdn.com, a feature-flag and analytics service used across the industry, and app.wascript.com, which fits a WhatsApp automation backend. The atlassian.com and atlassian-isolated.net entries arrive alongside the design-token strings, so they come out of the same bundled style data.
Two obfuscation findings exist. OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_86_085ff17f-7684-4a41-bfdd-8bd9d5293bb2259.js is a webpack module-wrapping pattern. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/ed6113f2-bc09-4421-a453-bbbd66fe9488.DCssQ7AT.js is a base64 block in a file named for a funnel feature. A blob that size usually carries an embedded image, font or bundled library. It is the one finding a closer look would settle, and it sits beside zero malware matches.
The strongest argument against reading this as scanner noise is volume: 1,200 entries on an extension with 29 users and a developer contact that is just an email address, [email protected]. Volume is the weakest form of evidence. The 421 indicator entries and 754 code-style warnings come from the two categories that fire on minified JavaScript regardless of what the code does. Strip those out and what remains is a webpack bundle making ordinary network calls, referencing a design system, and shipping a base64 asset. A re-scan that captures the manifest match patterns would close the one gap left by the empty permission arrays.
To change this reading you would need a finding that ties code to a destination: a fetch or socket call aimed at a host unrelated to WhatsApp, chat sync or analytics. No such call shows up in the 22 network hits or in the endpoint list.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware and zero malware-signature findings; the 1,200 entries are 421 IoC and 754 code-smell, the two categories known to fire on any non-trivial JavaScript bundle
- All 22 network findings are generic usage detections (NET-FETCH, NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-JQUERY_AJAX) inside version-stamped hashed webpack chunks under content/assets/js/
- Endpoint list consists of CSS design tokens and JSON field names misread as hosts (border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange, btn.glass, calls.function.arguments.delta), plus Statsig analytics and app.wascript.com, a WhatsApp-as-a-Service backend
- Only obfuscation hits are a base64 asset block in funnil/assets/js/ed6113f2-bc09-4421-a453-bbbd66fe9488.DCssQ7AT.js and a webpack module-wrap pattern in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_86_085ff17f-7684-4a41-bfdd-8bd9d5293bb2259.js
- Extension behaviour matches its stated purpose: content scripts and background fetch calls consistent with a WhatsApp Web CRM
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor reading CSS design tokens and JSON field names as domains
- 754 code-smell warnings generated by bundled minified JavaScript
- Network findings are framework usage detections (fetch, socket.io, jQuery AJAX) rather than named destinations
- 421 IoC entries with no corresponding malware or malware-signature finding
Reviewed 2026-10-10; recommended action: no action; model confidence 80%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
14 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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