UCanSearch for Copilot
The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (54/100) still counts them. The review covers version 0.3.6, not the analysed version 0.4.1.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 5 days ago 17 November 2026
- Version
- v0.4.1
- Artifact
- SHA256 34acbf45…40d56e
- Detail
- Full list
Is UCanSearch for Copilot safe?
UCanSearch for Copilot bolts web search and page fetching onto GitHub Copilot. Its manifest asks for no permissions and no host permissions, so it gets no blanket access to your files or browser tabs. Network traffic is where it lives: queries leave for api.deepseek.com and page fetches come back the same way. A handful of documentation and badge hosts sit alongside, among them api-docs.deepseek.com and img.shields.io.
One alert points at a fetch call in extension/out/http.js at line 61. That file holds compiled build output. Shipping a fetch to a search API inside an extension built to call a search API makes sense.
The rest of the list needs context. Seventeen strings got tagged as domains. Several are dotted property names such as item.site and toast.show, lifted out of minified code by pattern matching. Three more are Python filenames from the project itself: 接口冒烟.py, 清单校验.py, 生成面板预览.py. Twenty-six low-severity code-smell rules round things out, and those fire on any bundle that touches fetch and environment variables.
Suppose the fetch in http.js pointed somewhere other than DeepSeek. Search text would be leaving for an unknown host, and that would matter. The endpoint list gives no sign of it. Reachable hosts line up with DeepSeek, Hugging Face and Microsoft's schema server, which matches the feature set described on the extension page. Nothing reads .env files, SSH keys or the editor's secret storage, and no postinstall step runs code. The scanner tripped on minified dotted strings and generic rules, and the extension comes out clean.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
8 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 1 | package.json | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 4 | out/config.jsout/http.jsmedia/panel.js +1 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 1 | media/panel.js | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 1 | out/panel.js | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 2 | media/panel.jsLICENSE.txt | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 4 | out/panel.jsout/extension.jsreadme.md +1 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 15 | out/balance.jsout/searchService.jsmedia/panel.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 1 | out/panel.js | - |
Network Indicators
Concrete URLs, domains, IPs, emails, and hashes extracted from the analyzed artifact.
Loading network indicators
Long lists can take a few seconds.
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidenceZoneYottaZenith
Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
13 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
8 rules(29 hits)AI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
The extension declares an empty permissions array and an empty host_permissions array, so nothing in the manifest grants workspace reads, process spawning or shell access. Its stated job is to route web search and page fetches through DeepSeek and hand results to GitHub Copilot. The only capability finding that maps to that job is NET-FETCH-extension/out/http.js-61, a fetch call sitting in the compiled out/ directory. Calling a search API from an extension built to call a search API needs no further explanation.
No credential findings show up at all. The secret bucket stays empty, and the filesystem hits that normally accompany credential theft, reads of .env, .git/config, .ssh or cloud config files, never appear. The 26 code-smell alerts are the standard set that fires on any Node.js bundle: environment variable references in the HTTP layer, eval-shaped patterns in bundled helpers. On their own they describe a program that makes HTTP requests, which matches what this program does.
The IoC list deserves separate treatment, because it is the largest bucket and the least meaningful. Strings like toast.show and item.site look like domains to an extractor and like property access to anyone reading the source. Three entries are Python file names from the repo itself: 接口冒烟.py, 清单校验.py, 生成面板预览.py. Those come from a filename scraper, not from network configuration. Removing that noise leaves api.deepseek.com, api-docs.deepseek.com, platform.deepseek.com, huggingface.co, img.shields.io, schemas.openxmlformats.org and microsoft.visualstudio.services.links.support. Every one of those fits the extension's design or a docs and badge URL. The single string that does not fit is 7omd.ki, which reads like a truncated fragment rather than a live host, and one unresolvable two-label string in a list of documentation domains carries little weight.
The strongest counterargument is the zero install count and the unfamiliar publisher. A brand-new extension with no users, from a name nobody recognizes, talking to a third-party search API, fits the profile a data-harvesting probe would present. What undercuts that reading is the absence of anything to harvest: no workspace permissions, no secret reads, no process execution, no obfuscation, no postinstall behavior. A harvesting extension needs at least one of those, and this one asks for none.
What remains is a small tool that sends your search queries to DeepSeek. Queries leave the machine and pass through a third party, so the traffic pattern deserves a place in your install decision. The advertised function covers it.
Key Reasons
- Empty permissions and host_permissions arrays: no workspace, process or secret-store access requested in the manifest.
- The sole network finding, NET-FETCH-extension/out/http.js-61, is a fetch call in compiled build output that performs the extension's advertised DeepSeek search function.
- Zero secret and zero malware-signature findings; no reads of .env, .ssh, .git/config or cloud credentials anywhere in the evidence.
- Most of the 17 IoC entries are extractor artifacts: dotted property access (toast.show, item.site) and repo Python filenames (接口冒烟.py, 清单校验.py, 生成面板预览.py).
- Remaining endpoints (api.deepseek.com, huggingface.co, img.shields.io, schemas.openxmlformats.org) match the extension's documented design or documentation/badge URLs.
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor read minified dotted property chains (toast.show, item.site) as domain names.
- Three IoC entries are Python source filenames from the repository, produced by a filename scraper rather than network configuration.
- 26 code-smell YARA rules fire on standard Node.js fetch, env-var and bundled-helper patterns in extension/out/ build output.
- The only network finding is a fetch to the third-party search API that is the extension's entire stated purpose.
Reviewed 2026-10-30 · version 0.3.6; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 78%.
VS Code version history
Risk trend by version
2 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.
Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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