Microsoft Edge Add-ons Verified domain

BeFrugal: Automatic Coupons and Cash Back

9c975702-c340-5f73-91cd-1f95f0fbb9fb | Store v2026.6.266.0
58/ 100
MEDIUM risk
AI review verdict
Review before use

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (58/100) still counts them. The review covers version 2026.6.260.0, not the analysed version 2026.6.266.0.

Analysis record

Analysed
Today 21 November 2026
Version
v2026.6.266.0
Artifact
SHA256 722256b4…3b376e
Detail
Full list

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

232 findings
Showing 25 of 111 · highest severity first

YARA Rule Matches

12 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
LOWpostinstall persistence mechanism 2
js/purify.min.jsjs/shoptoolbar.js
-
LOWpostinstall file download 14
popup.htmljs/webRequest.jsjs/popup.js +11 more
-
LOWNoUseWeakRandom 4
js/bootstrap.min.jsjs/contentscript.jsjs/shoptoolbar.js +1 more
-
LOWSQLInjection 2
js/jquery.min.jsjs/bootstrap.min.js
-
LOWUntrustedContentShouldNotBeIncluded 1
js/contentscript.js
-
LOWpostinstall crypto operations 4
_metadata/verified_contents.jsonjs/contentscript.jsjs/shoptoolbar.js +1 more
-
LOWpostinstall network communication 32
AutoApplyResources/inject/couponsNoItems.jsjs/webRequest.jsjs/jquery.min.js +29 more
-
LOWpostinstall file manipulation 26
js/jquery.min.jsdisable/disable_page2.jspopup.html +23 more
-
LOWpostinstall system command 11
bootstrap.min.cssjs/shoptoolbar.jsjs/popup.js +8 more
-
LOWpostinstall environment access 1
js/fetchXML.js
-
LOWpostinstall obfuscation 23
js/webRequest.jspopup.htmlnotifybar/notifybar-iOS.html +20 more
-
LOWDebuggerStatementsShouldNotBeUsed 1
js/contentscript.js
-

Publisher Evidence

Limited evidence

BeFrugal

Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.

Edge does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.

47
Publisher domain
befrugal.com
Observed
Store verification signal
Limited signal
Limited
Extension portfolio
6
Portfolio

12 evidence rows available.

Finding Categories

13
Network
168
IoC Indicators

YARA Rules Matched

12 rules(121 hits)
postinstall persistence mechanism postinstall file download NoUseWeakRandom SQLInjection UntrustedContentShouldNotBeIncluded postinstall crypto operations postinstall network communication postinstall file manipulation postinstall system command postinstall environment access postinstall obfuscation DebuggerStatementsShouldNotBeUsed

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

BeFrugal is an affiliate cash-back extension. It watches the page you are on, matches the store against a coupon database, and injects a toolbar or offer. That design needs broad site access and live calls to a coupon server, and both are visible in the code.

The network findings sit in four files: js/shoptoolbar.js (lines 155, 156, 207, 227, 308, 310, 490, 608, 646), js/contentscript.js:351, js/fetchXML.js:25 and :29, and js/popup.js:1290. Nine of the thirteen are in the toolbar script, which is the file that draws the coupon panel. A file that renders live discount offers has to request them. NET-FETCH-js/fetchXML.js-25 and -29 are the XML request path, the shape you expect from a feed pull. None of these findings describe a request assembled from user input or sent to an address built at runtime.

The endpoint list is where extraction breaks down. Entries such as "befrugal.com.coupons.cashbacksignuppopup.nu", "couponblob.coupons", "coupondetails.discount", "browsertype.chrome", "copyfrom.select", "button.bg" and "custom-control-input.is" are CSS selectors and dotted property accesses that were read as hostnames. The addresses that survive that filter are the brand's own: befrugalhotels.com, couponviewer.com, bfbrowser.com. The same goes for the volume elsewhere. Nothing matched a malware signature, no obfuscation finding fired, no secrets were lifted from the code, and the manifest pass came back empty. The remaining volume is code-quality noise of the kind generic Node and JavaScript rules produce on any large codebase, which is why js/contentscript.js and js/popup.js collect matches without any behavior behind them.

The strongest counterargument is the listing itself. The developer name field is blank and this Edge copy shows no recorded users, which is the profile of an anonymous republish. Two endpoints, at.show and autotooltip.top, also read oddly next to the brand domains. A skeptic would call that a lookalike wrapper. The answer sits in the surrounding evidence: at.show is listed beside provable parse artifacts like button.bg and copyfrom.select, so it belongs to the same extraction error class until traffic capture says otherwise. A coupon tooltip endpoint is also consistent with the stated function. And the name is BeFrugal, a long-running cash-back brand, not a near-copy of a more popular extension, so the impersonation signal is absent. If runtime analysis ever shows js/shoptoolbar.js sending browsing data to autotooltip.top or at.show, that changes the picture. Nothing in the static code does.

What would raise this above noise is one concrete thing: a manifest permission that exceeds coupon injection, or a request in js/fetchXML.js carrying page content off-domain. Neither is present here.

Key Reasons

  • All 13 network findings are NET-FETCH calls in the coupon UI and feed scripts (js/shoptoolbar.js, js/fetchXML.js, js/contentscript.js, js/popup.js), matching a cash-back extension's core function
  • Zero malware-signature, zero malware, zero obfuscation and zero manifest-analysis findings across the scanned files
  • Endpoint list contains obvious parse artifacts (coupondetails.discount, copyfrom.select, button.bg, custom-control-input.is, browsertype.chrome) showing hostname extraction failure on property chains
  • Verified brand domain cluster befrugalhotels.com, couponviewer.com and bfbrowser.com, with no lookalike of a more popular extension
  • No permission or host_permission entries in the analyzed manifest, so capability is narrower than a hijacker or proxyware profile

False Positive Considerations

  • IoC extractor reading CSS selectors and property access chains as hostnames
  • Generic code-quality rules firing on large bundled JavaScript in js/contentscript.js and js/popup.js
  • Score inflation from IoC and code-smell volume with no supporting malware evidence
  • Dotted-string hostname parsing producing nested entries like befrugal.com.coupons.cashbacksignuppopup.nu

Reviewed 2026-10-31 · version 2026.6.260.0; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 78%.

Source Code Viewer

Source Code Not Available

Source code is not available for this version of the extension.

Frequently Asked Questions