Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
WAME
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- 5 days ago
- Version
- v7.4.3.87
- Artifact
- SHA256 956…9A8
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is WAME safe?
WAME is a Chrome extension that adds a customer dashboard on top of WhatsApp Web, so you can label chats, run quick replies and keep conversations organized in one place. To do that, its content scripts run alongside WhatsApp and its background page talks to the developer's own server at app.wascript.com, using socket.io for the live connection plus fetch and jQuery AJAX calls for everything else. The scan of this version lists no permission entries, so the clearest picture of what the extension can reach comes from those endpoints and from the code that runs on WhatsApp pages.
The scariest-looking flags are the two obfuscation matches: a large base64 block inside funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js and indirect function calls inside content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js. If someone were hiding a payload, those are where they would hide it. Large base64 blocks in a built JavaScript file are normally inlined images, fonts or source maps, and indirect calls are what a bundler produces after renaming modules. Nothing in those files matches a known malware signature.
The scanner's domain list explains most of the rest of the noise. Entries like border.radius.circle, btn.glass and color.border.accent.orange are style tokens from a stylesheet, and api.atlassian.com and api.statsigcdn.com come from libraries bundled into the same build. A chat tool connecting to its own server is not the same as a chat tool sending your messages somewhere strange, and the one domain tied to this product belongs to the developer.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2899.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289145.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289208.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | crm/assets/js/emoji-picker-react.esm.aMh8OwYb.jscrm/index.jsfunnil/assets/js/2e0cf7f6-e9bc-41e0-84b5-f570a0e461c8.B8VBrnTG.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 55 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28927.jscrm/assets/js/index.DCTZnrKF.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289139.js +52 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2893.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2899.jscrm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28925.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28966.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289185.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289174.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 94 | _metadata/verified_contents.jsoncontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28999.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28945.js +91 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | fluxo/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2896.jsfluxo/assets/js/b89d7b82-41f7-4061-9bc0-ae95ae5cd0a2.BLiJgZ4E.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | crm/assets/js/modal.CMbmE-rI.jsfluxo/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28925.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | crm/assets/js/modal.DGPvvr-c.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2894.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289166.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2894.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289236.jscrm/assets/js/index.zzn1EYNa.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | crm/assets/js/5e35787c-36b2-4a56-8ea4-4e0a75aa6943.D2Np3EBj.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289175.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d2895.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | crm/assets/js/index.CJ3d7GJf.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28925.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28989.js +169 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
WAME describes itself as a CRM for WhatsApp Web, and the code shipped in version 7.4.3.87 looks like the client half of that product. The scan returned 1,193 findings. The number worth starting with is zero: no malware signatures and no credential rules matched anywhere in the build. What remains is library fingerprints, bundler artifacts and extractor noise.
The network bucket holds 22 findings, and every one is a library pattern rather than evidence of hidden traffic. NET-JQUERY_AJAX fires at content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28923.js:13, NET-SOCKET_IO at content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28912.js:15, and NET-FETCH at background.js:137 plus a row of numbered chunks under content/assets/js/. A CRM that tracks WhatsApp conversations needs a persistent connection to a server and a way to make requests. Socket.io and fetch are the ordinary tools for that. The endpoint list backs this up. app.wascript.com is the only entry that matches the product, and it reads as the vendor's own API. The rest is what the extractor produced from minified code: border.radius.circle, btn.glass and color.border.accent.orange are CSS tokens read as hostnames, while api.atlassian.com and api.statsigcdn.com arrive inside bundled third-party libraries rather than from extension code.
Two obfuscation findings are flagged. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 points at funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js:1, and OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT at content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js:1. Both are what a bundler leaves behind. Base64 blobs of that size are inlined fonts, images or source maps. Indirect function calls are how renamed module exports get resolved at runtime. The pattern that would justify alarm is an obfuscation finding sharing a file with a malware signature, and that does not happen in this build.
The bulk of the count is 754 code-smell findings and 414 IoCs. Code-smell rules match minified JavaScript as a category, which is why they carry low severity, and the IoC list is visibly contaminated by property chains and CSS class names lifted out of the bundle. Neither bucket identifies a behaviour. The manifest analysis produced a single finding and the permission arrays came back empty, so the extraction of declared access is thin.
The strongest counterargument is that any WhatsApp CRM sits on top of your conversations. Its content scripts run on WhatsApp pages and hold a socket.io connection, so message text passes through code the vendor controls and reaches app.wascript.com. If that traffic went to a domain unrelated to the product, or if secret and credential findings turned up beside the message handling, this verdict would flip. Neither is present. The endpoint matches the product name, the scan records no secret findings and no IoCs aimed at login pages, and the live connection is the feature working as advertised. A fresh manifest extraction would close the one gap.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware-signature, malware, secret and tool-poisoning findings across 1,193 results
- All 22 network findings match library patterns (jQuery AJAX, socket.io, fetch) inside content/assets/js/ and background.js
- The only product-relevant endpoint is app.wascript.com; remaining listed domains are CSS tokens or bundled Atlassian/Statsig CDNs
- Obfuscation flags are a base64 blob and function indirection, both typical bundler output with no co-located malware signature
- The extension is a WhatsApp Web CRM, so reading chat content and holding a live server connection is its stated function
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor read CSS tokens such as border.radius.circle and btn.glass as hostnames
- Network findings are library fingerprints (NET-JQUERY_AJAX, NET-SOCKET_IO, NET-FETCH) in bundled chunks
- 754 code-smell findings fired on minified bundle output
- Obfuscation flags (LARGE_BASE64, FUNCTION_INDIRECT) are standard webpack/esbuild artifacts
Reviewed 2026-10-13; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 76%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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