Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
AmizApp
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- Today
- Version
- v7.4.3.89
- Artifact
- SHA256 CA1…418
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is AmizApp safe?
AmizApp describes itself as a CRM for WhatsApp Web that helps organize chats and manage business conversations. The extension declares no permissions and no host permissions, which means it cannot read or modify content on WhatsApp Web pages. The network endpoints extracted from the code include app.wascript.com, which is the extension's own backend, alongside strings like border.radius.circle and color.border.accent.orange that are CSS design tokens from a UI library. These are not web addresses the extension contacts.
The scanner flagged 1,188 items across the extension's files. The bulk of these are code-smell detections that fire on standard JavaScript patterns like fetch calls and Socket.IO connections. The file content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28924.js triggers a network detection for jQuery AJAX usage. The file background.js triggers a fetch detection at line 137. These are normal operations for any extension that communicates with a server. A base64 obfuscation finding in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js matches the pattern of an embedded resource like a font or image.
The verdict follows because zero malware signatures matched anywhere in the extension. The high finding count comes from the scanner counting every bundled library pattern and every CSS property name as a separate signal. The Atlassian API endpoints in the network list are unexplained for a WhatsApp tool. They sit alongside obvious non-domains, which points to the extractor pulling substrings from unrelated code. The network activity consists of standard API calls to the extension's own backend.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | postinstall file download | 56 | funnil/assets/ttf/Segoeuibold.chunk.ttfcrm/assets/ttf/Segoeuibolditalic.chunk.ttfcrm/assets/js/08720d6a-0be0-46e1-9843-98b7db20fc19.BMVVV2Gw.js +53 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe6.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe264.jscrm/assets/js/004fed15-8877-43f0-8efb-694b1f83470a.DHS87NkU.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe9.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe27.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe199.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | fluxo/assets/js/4ee11da8-398e-42c1-a7a6-562435dd4099.Ltqe_vjw.jscrm/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe264.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe25.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe27.jsfluxo/assets/js/emoji-picker-react.esm.B9A-HLPi.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | fluxo/index.jscrm/assets/js/index.UStLUAuU.jsfluxo/assets/js/index.C4PbSAL1.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 93 | background.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe186.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe107.js +90 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe6.jsfluxo/assets/js/dacb7d41-b2cc-4fc5-b0cb-217764ce9fc7.D3Llan5p.jsfluxo/index.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe11.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe25.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe99.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe199.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe7.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe170.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe11.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe25.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | fluxo/assets/js/4ee11da8-398e-42c1-a7a6-562435dd4099.Ltqe_vjw.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe152.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe5.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | crm/assets/js/comp.CMYrKi2q.jsfluxo/assets/js/index.CoVgHeOJ.jscrm/assets/js/0a36a81f-dcc0-487f-a650-e9989069185e.ZmKe4BeO.js +169 more | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
The AmizApp extension describes itself as a CRM for WhatsApp Web, but the evidence tells a different story about what the scanner actually found. Of the 1,188 total findings, 754 are classified as code-smell at low severity. These match patterns like postinstall_* and credential_* rules that fire on any non-trivial JavaScript. They detect that the code uses standard web APIs. They do not detect harmful behavior. The remaining 409 IoC findings follow the same pattern. The network endpoints extracted include strings like border.radius.circle, color.border.accent.orange, and btn.glass, which are CSS design tokens from a UI framework. These are not domains the extension contacts. The IoC extractor pulled property access chains and style values and counted them as indicators of compromise.
The 22 network findings all detect standard web API usage. Files like content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28924.js trigger NET-JQUERY_AJAX and NET-SOCKET_IO detections. The background.js file triggers a NET-FETCH detection at line 137. A CRM that syncs chat data with a backend server needs these APIs. None of the network findings point to suspicious external domains.
Two obfuscation findings exist. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64 fires on funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js:1, which contains a large base64 string. This is consistent with an embedded font, image, or configuration payload. OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT fires on content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js:1, a pattern common in minified bundles where function references are assigned through intermediate variables. Neither finding co-occurs with malware signatures. Zero malware signatures matched across the entire extension.
The network endpoints list includes api.dev.atlassian.com and api.stg.atlassian.com, which are Atlassian development and staging APIs. A WhatsApp CRM has no obvious reason to contact Atlassian servers. These likely originate from a bundled dependency that includes Atlassian SDK code, or from the IoC extractor matching substrings in unrelated code. The extension also declares zero permissions and zero host permissions. It cannot interact with WhatsApp Web's DOM or read messages. A CRM that cannot access the page it claims to manage is either broken or its manifest is incomplete.
A skeptic would point to the Atlassian endpoints and the obfuscation findings as evidence of hidden behavior. The counterargument is straightforward. Zero malware signatures matched. The obfuscation findings are isolated and lack co-located malicious indicators. The Atlassian domains sit alongside obvious false positives like CSS design tokens. The extension's low user count of 36 and generic developer email ([email protected]) raise legitimacy questions. Legitimacy is separate from malice. The scanner tripped on bundled code patterns and design system strings. No finding demonstrates malicious behavior.
Key Reasons
- 754 code-smell findings at low severity fire on standard JavaScript patterns
- 409 IoC findings include CSS design tokens like border.radius.circle and color.border.accent.orange
- Zero malware signatures matched across the entire extension
- 22 network findings detect standard web API usage (fetch, jQuery AJAX, Socket.IO)
- Two obfuscation findings are isolated and lack co-located malicious indicators
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor matching CSS design tokens and property access chains
- Code-smell rules firing on standard web API usage
- Bundled dependencies creating multiplicative false positives
- Obfuscation rules matching minified bundle patterns
Reviewed 2026-10-11; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 72%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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