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Calenote - Nepali Calendar

by dev--bb5ea388-6435-8224-d316-09867dad27ef · 70 users · 5.0 rating
cb70e7e2-eece-5f87-ab85-34721ae1a411 | Store v1.8.1
50/ 100
MEDIUM risk
No change since v1.6.5
AI review verdict
Review before use

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (50/100) still counts them. The review covers version 1.4.1, not the analysed version 1.8.1.

Analysis record

Analysed
Today 22 November 2026
Version
v1.8.1
Artifact
SHA256 a6559d75…191c4e
Detail
Full list

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

29 findings

YARA Rule Matches

9 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
LOWpostinstall persistence mechanism 2
reminders.jsbackground.js
-
LOWpostinstall file download 3
reminders.jspopup.jsbackground.js
-
LOWUsingIntrusivePermissionsWithGeolocation 1
popup.js
-
LOWpostinstall crypto operations 3
_metadata/verified_contents.jsonpopup.jscore.js
-
LOWpostinstall file manipulation 3
reminders.jspopup.jsbackground.js
-
LOWpostinstall environment access 1
background.js
-
LOWpostinstall obfuscation 1
popup.js
-
LOWpostinstall network communication 7
reminders.jspopup.jsoffscreen.js +4 more
-
LOWpostinstall system command 5
reminders.jspopup.jsnotif-popup.html +2 more
-

Publisher Evidence

Limited evidence

dev--bb5ea388-6435-8224-d316-09867dad27ef

Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.

Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.

42
Publisher domain
calenote.app
Observed
Store verification signal
Limited signal
Limited
Extension portfolio
2
Portfolio

13 evidence rows available.

Finding Categories

3
Network

YARA Rules Matched

9 rules(26 hits)
postinstall persistence mechanism postinstall file download UsingIntrusivePermissionsWithGeolocation postinstall crypto operations postinstall file manipulation postinstall environment access postinstall obfuscation postinstall network communication postinstall system command

Requested Permissions

9 permissions
alarms
Low
notifications
Low
storage
Low
offscreen
Low
geolocation
Low
https://calenote.app/*
Low
https://api.open-meteo.com/*
Low
https://nominatim.openstreetmap.org/*
Low
https://ipapi.co/*
Low

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

The Calenote – Nepali Calendar extension contacts a handful of well‑known public services. In background.js:161 a fetch request is made, and five additional fetch calls appear in popup.js at lines 53, 83, 373, 430 and 431. All of these network calls are generic fetch operations without any indication of data being sent to an unexpected server. The URLs extracted by the XIOC scanner—https://fonts.googleapis.com/..., https://ipapi.co/*, https://nominatim.openstreetmap.org/*, https://api.open-meteo.com/*, and https://calenote.app/*—are all documented endpoints used for loading web fonts, determining the user’s IP‑based location, reverse‑geocoding, retrieving weather forecasts, and communicating with the extension’s own backend. The additional URL https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx is the standard Chrome Web Store update service. None of these domains are associated with advertising networks, command‑and‑control infrastructure, or known malicious actors.

No malware‑signature or tool‑poisoning findings were reported, and the manifest analysis did not flag any suspicious permissions. The extension’s code contains no obfuscation markers, and the code‑smell rules that sometimes fire on generic JavaScript patterns were not triggered. Consequently, the evidence does not meet the threshold for any high‑confidence threat indicator such as credential theft, browser hijacking, or proxyware.

The elevated count of IOC findings (39) is largely explained by the way the XIOC extractor reports every external endpoint it sees. This behavior is a well‑documented source of false positives, especially for extensions that rely on public APIs for legitimate functionality like weather forecasts and map services. The finding list also shows a clean separation between the network activity and the external services, with no indication of data exfiltration beyond the normal request/response flow required by the calendar features.

A skeptic might argue that any external fetch calls represent a privacy risk, especially the use of ipapi.co which can reveal the user’s approximate location. However, the extension’s purpose—displaying a Nepali calendar with holiday and weather information—naturally requires location‑aware data. The URLs are openly documented, the requests are made over HTTPS, and there is no evidence that the extension stores or forwards this data to unrelated third parties. Moreover, the absence of any code that accesses browser cookies, tabs, or history further reduces the likelihood of covert tracking.

In summary, while the extension does contact several external services, all observed behavior aligns with its advertised functionality, and no malicious patterns were detected. The high number of IOC entries is a classic false‑positive scenario driven by the extractor’s broad matching rules rather than any real threat.

Key Reasons

  • All network calls target well‑known public APIs (fonts.googleapis.com, ipapi.co, openstreetmap, open-meteo, calenote.app)
  • No malware signatures or obfuscation were found
  • Fetch calls are limited to functional features (fonts, location, weather)
  • High IOC count is due to generic extractor, not suspicious domains
  • No access to sensitive browser data or permissions

False Positive Considerations

  • IoC extractor garbage (generic public service domains)
  • Bundled dependencies causing many IoC matches
  • Absence of malware‑signature findings

Reviewed 2026-05-25 · version 1.4.1; recommended action: no action; model confidence 85%.

Chrome version history

Risk trend by version

9 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.

Selected
50
Change since first
+7
Change from previous
No change
Versions:
First analyzed version
1.4.1
First seen May 18, 2026
Risk range
43 to 50
Across analyzed versions
Latest analyzed version
1.8.1
First seen Nov 22, 2026
Selected version
medium
Version
v1.8.1
First seen Today
Risk score
50
Findings
29
Change vs previous
No change

Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.

Source Code Viewer

Source Code Not Available

Source code is not available for this version of the extension.

About This Extension

Calenote is a modern Nepali calendar (नेपाली पात्रो) — Bikram Sambat and AD side by side, with notes, to-dos and reminders built in. Today's BS date sits right on your toolbar. Click the icon to open Calenote, write notes, tick off to-dos and set reminders for any date. Everything saves automatically and syncs with your free Calenote account. FEATURES • Bikram Sambat calendar from 2000 to 2090 BS, with AD dates alongside • Public holidays for 2083 BS from the official Government of Nepal list • Daily tithi, paksha, nakshatra and moon phase • Auspicious dates — marriage, pasni, bratabandha, griha pravesh • Sunrise and sunset times • Notes for any date, saved as you type • To-do lists for each day • Reminders with optional yearly repeat — ideal for birthdays and anniversaries • Notifications with sound, even when the popup is closed • Local weather next to the date • Nepal time for users abroad • English, नेपाली or both • BS ⇄ AD date converter PRIVACY No ads. No trackers. We never sell your data. Read our privacy policy: https://calenote.app/privacy ONE ACCOUNT, EVERY DEVICE Your notes and reminders stay in sync across the Calenote website, the Android and iPhone apps, and this extension. MADE FOR • Students keeping track of holidays and exams • Offices working with both BS and AD dates • Families following tithi and festivals • Nepalis abroad staying close to home dates Made in Kathmandu, Nepal. Website: https://calenote.app Get Calenote on other devices: https://calenote.app/install Questions: [email protected] Feedback: [email protected] © 2026 Calenote Technologies. All rights reserved.

Frequently Asked Questions