Our analysis confirmed the behaviour described in the threat library entry. Do not install it. Read the analysis and indicators →
Also reported by malext.io, reddit.com
CRM TURBINADO
Confirmed member of a tracked malicious supply-chain campaign.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- Today
- Version
- v7.4.3.89
- Artifact
- SHA256 A33…71F
- Source
- Findings (non-IoC)
Is CRM TURBINADO safe?
CRM TURBINADO is a Chrome extension for a Brazilian customer-relationship tool, version 7.4.3.87, with about 25 users. Its manifest declares no host permissions, and the code that does the work lives under content/assets/js/. Among the addresses it contacts are app.wascript.com, a WhatsApp automation service, api.statsigcdn.com for feature flags, and api.atlassian.com for Jira and Confluence. Those are the connections a CRM makes when it pulls tickets from Jira and keeps a WhatsApp conversation tied to a customer record.
The flag that matters most sits in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js, where a base64 block was spotted. Base64 is a way of writing binary data as text. If that block decoded into hidden code, it could run things the store listing never showed you. In a build folder, base64 is far more often a font, an icon or a source map, and the UUID-plus-hash filename is how bundlers name generated files. A second flag, FUNCTION_INDIRECT in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js, points at function calls written as property lookups, which minifiers produce constantly.
Most of the rest comes from the libraries the extension carries. The scanner found Socket.IO, jQuery's AJAX helper and plain fetch calls in content/assets/js/ and background.js, which is how a chat-connected app talks to its server, and it flagged hundreds of code-quality patterns that fire on any large JavaScript file. The address list includes odd entries like border.radius.circle and btn.glass, which are CSS values the scanner read as domain names. Nothing matched a malware signature, and nothing pointed at a domain known for stealing logins. What this extension can reach comes from the code it bundles rather than from a permission list, and that code follows conversations on a WhatsApp page, which is broad by design for this category of tool.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
16 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | ServerHostnameNotVerified | 1 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe.js | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 15 | whatsapp/wpp/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe5.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe129.js +12 more | - |
| LOW | credential env files | 30 | fluxo/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe187.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe178.js +27 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 19 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe129.jswhatsapp/wpp/index.jscrm/assets/js/08720d6a-0be0-46e1-9843-98b7db20fc19.BMVVV2Gw.js +16 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 56 | crm/assets/js/67906c74-c7f3-4442-b1d7-a96f2fdc180c.CYiu0-km.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe182.jsfluxo/assets/ttf/Segoeui.chunk.ttf +53 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseEval | 1 | whatsapp/wpp/index.js | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 38 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe22.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe31.jsfluxo/assets/js/4ee11da8-398e-42c1-a7a6-562435dd4099.Ltqe_vjw.js +35 more | - |
| LOW | SQLInjection | 1 | fluxo/index.js | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 111 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe.jscrm/assets/js/createAudio.BgCuQTH3.jscrm/assets/js/08720d6a-0be0-46e1-9843-98b7db20fc19.BMVVV2Gw.js +108 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 93 | fluxo/index.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe166.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe149.js +90 more | - |
| LOW | OriginsNotVerified | 5 | crm/assets/js/243aa5f1-2d3f-4572-905f-74262466e3fe.B8_nURbH.jsfunnil/assets/js/ac7c4918-d573-4107-aa70-4001c8f5324c.B8_nURbH.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe6.js +2 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 77 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe204.js_metadata/verified_contents.jsoncontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe10.js +74 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 44 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe24.jsfunnil/assets/js/4239d5b1-9c74-4659-9c18-dea390964016.CWTSEfuw.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe44.js +41 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 83 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe39.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe170.jscrm/assets/js/index.UStLUAuU.js +80 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 8 | fluxo/assets/js/4ee11da8-398e-42c1-a7a6-562435dd4099.Ltqe_vjw.jsfunnil/assets/js/4239d5b1-9c74-4659-9c18-dea390964016.CWTSEfuw.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe152.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 172 | content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe128.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe32.jscontent/assets/js/v_7_4_3_89_6a967488-454e-474e-a8c0-67247cae29fe122.js +169 more | - |
Network Indicators
Concrete URLs, domains, IPs, emails, and hashes extracted from the analyzed artifact.
Loading network indicators
IoC detail rows are loaded outside the initial page render.
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidencePublisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Chrome does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
11 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
16 rules(754 hits)Requested Permissions
5 permissionsAI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
CRM TURBINADO is a Brazilian customer-relationship tool packaged as a Chrome extension, scanned at version 7.4.3.87 with about 25 users. Its manifest declares no host permissions, and the working code sits in content/assets/js/ plus a parallel funnil/ (Portuguese for funnel) tree. Across 1,204 findings, the malware and malware-signature counters are both zero. Everything flagged is a library pattern, a code-quality match, or a string the extractor misread.
The 22 network findings are library fingerprints. NET-JQUERY_AJAX-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28923.js-1 fires on jQuery's AJAX helper, NET-SOCKET_IO-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28912.js-15 on the Socket.IO client, and NET-FETCH-background.js-137 on a fetch call in the service worker. A CRM that keeps a live chat feed and syncs records needs all three. None of these findings names a destination.
The endpoint list shows how much of the input is noise. Entries like border.radius.circle, btn.glass, color.border.accent.orange and calls.function.arguments.delta are CSS custom properties and object property chains, read as hostnames. The names that do resolve describe a business stack: api.statsigcdn.com for feature flags, api.atlassian.com and api.atlassian-us-gov-mod.com for Jira and Confluence, and app.wascript.com, a WhatsApp automation service. That set is what a Brazilian sales CRM would talk to.
Two obfuscation findings deserve naming. OBFUSCATION-LARGE_BASE64-funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-2ad5-4714-8614-9a2b4c455349.CgnacD38.js-1 flags a base64 block in a file whose name is a UUID plus a content hash. OBFUSCATION-FUNCTION_INDIRECT-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d289260.js-1 flags function calls reached through property lookups. Both are standard bundler output; webpack and rollup generate hashed filenames and reference modules indirectly so they can be loaded on demand. The pattern that would worry us is a base64 block that decodes into executable code sitting in the same file as a malware signature, and that is absent here.
The remaining 754 findings are code-smell matches concentrated in those same bundled files. They flag generic patterns such as eval-shaped calls and weak randomness, which nearly any minified application triggers. A skeptic would point at the empty permission arrays and the publisher's only contact being an email address, [email protected], and argue that a WhatsApp-syncing tool declaring no host permissions is either misparsed or hiding what it can reach. The single manifest-analysis finding supports the misparse theory, so that question stays open. What the scan does establish is that the build contains no known-bad domain and no malware signature, and none of the code reads stored passwords or cookies. Following a WhatsApp conversation and writing the result into a CRM is the extension's stated job.
Key Reasons
- Zero malware or malware-signature matches across 1,204 findings
- All 22 network findings are library fingerprints (NET-SOCKET_IO-content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_0a650f0a-57a6-4989-860e-3a9d8748d28912.js-15, NET-JQUERY_AJAX-...d28923.js-1, NET-FETCH-background.js-137) with no named destination
- Resolvable endpoints form a normal business stack: app.wascript.com, api.statsigcdn.com, api.atlassian.com
- 425 IoC matches dominated by property-access and CSS tokens misread as domains (border.radius.circle, btn.glass, calls.function.arguments.delta)
- Obfuscation matches (LARGE_BASE64 in funnil/assets/js/9cf42769-...CgnacD38.js, FUNCTION_INDIRECT in content/assets/js/v_7_4_3_87_...289260.js) are webpack/rollup output patterns
False Positive Considerations
- IoC extractor read CSS custom properties and object property chains as hostnames
- 754 code-smell findings produced by bundled library code in content/assets/js/
- Network findings detect library APIs (jQuery AJAX, Socket.IO, fetch) rather than endpoints
- Base64 block and indirect call pattern are standard minified bundle output
Reviewed 2026-10-11; recommended action: monitor; model confidence 70%.
Chrome version history
Risk trend by version
15 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.
Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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