Notepad++ Plugins

CompressedFileViewer

dafbce82-eea6-5d60-af96-8e99c111eb29 | Store v5.1.1
20/ 100
LOW risk
No change since v5.1.0
AI review verdict
No high-risk signal observed

Based on the RiskyPlugins AI security review of the observed evidence.

No individual score drivers were recorded for this analysis.

Analysis record

Analysed
3 months ago 14 August 2026
Version
v5.1.1
Artifact
SHA256 dad24388…cfc42e
Detail
Full list

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

17 findings

Finding Categories

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

CompressedFileViewer opens and saves files in GZip and BZip2 formats. It also handles Brotli and XZ, and it supports ZStd. The plugin needs direct filesystem access for this functionality, because reading and writing compressed files requires opening and creating files on disk. Reading a .gz file requires the plugin to open it, and saving a compressed copy requires writing to disk. The manifest analysis produced no findings. Notepad++ plugins are native DLLs that run with the host's privileges, so the absence of secret findings (0 in the secret category) means no code path was flagged for accessing .env files, SSH keys, or cloud credentials. The only credential-related signal would come from code-smell rules, which fire on any reference to environment variables or API keys in normal code. This rule behavior is a common source of false positives in static analysis.

The IoC findings contain only SHA256 hashes and two IP-like strings, and nothing else. The strings XIOC-IP-5.1.1.0 and XIOC-IP-5.6.4.0 match the extension's own version number 5.1.1 and a likely dependency version 5.6.4, respectively. Neither string functions as a routable command-and-control address, and neither resolves to a network endpoint. The SHA256 hashes, such as XIOC-SHA256-EB86EC1D31BBE6D59EE3D949EB5D8D7A832289518F7EE42DE0E69E737EE09FAA, come from the binary and represent typical embedded checksums or resource identifiers in a compiled .NET assembly. The extractor pulled them from the binary itself, and they function as local identifiers.

Zero network findings exist. No exfiltration channel exists.

The 11 obfuscation findings are expected for a .NET 8 DLL because compiled IL code and embedded resources frequently trigger static obfuscation heuristics. Managed code often produces this result.

The 15 code-smell findings are similarly non-specific and do not indicate malicious intent, and they often arise from ordinary programming patterns. No tool-poisoning or dependency findings are present. No malware signatures matched.

The strongest counterargument is that 122 IoC findings plus obfuscation are sometimes seen in packed or malicious binaries. Every IoC here is either a generic hash or a version-like IP string. There are no malware signatures, no network indicators, and no secret-access findings. A malicious plugin would require at least one of those. The high IoC count follows a known false-positive pattern from the XIOC extractor on binary files, and the version-like IPs are a classic example of version strings being misread as network addresses.

Key Reasons

  • All 122 IoC findings are generic SHA256 hashes or version-like IP strings (5.1.1.0, 5.6.4.0) with no network context.
  • Zero secret findings, zero network findings, and zero malware signatures indicate no credential theft or exfiltration capability.
  • The 11 obfuscation findings are consistent with a compiled .NET 8 DLL, not intentional obfuscation.
  • The extension's file read/write purpose directly matches its stated functionality for compressed file formats.
  • No tool-poisoning or dependency findings, and no suspicious domains or IPs beyond version strings.

False Positive Considerations

  • XIOC hash extraction from binary files produces large volumes of generic SHA256 IoCs.
  • Version strings (5.1.1.0, 5.6.4.0) misclassified as IP addresses.
  • Obfuscation heuristics flag compiled .NET IL code and embedded resources.
  • Code-smell rules fire on normal .NET binary patterns.

Reviewed 2026-09-06 · version 5.1.1; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 85%.

Notepad++ version history

Risk trend by version

2 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.

Selected
20
Change since first
No change
Change from previous
No change
Versions:
First analyzed version
5.1.0
First seen Jun 4, 2026
Risk range
20 to 20
Across analyzed versions
Latest analyzed version
5.1.1
First seen Aug 14, 2026
Selected version
low
Version
v5.1.1
First seen 3 months ago
Risk score
20
Findings
17
Change vs previous
No change

Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.

Frequently Asked Questions