Firefox Add-ons Verified

AI Subtitle Translator

by Vinner Vi · 26 users
f3c9c135-004e-5073-89ab-a4eeb78ff112 | v2.7.3
85/ 100
CRITICAL risk
No change since v2.7.2
Analyst verdict
Do not install

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (85/100) still counts them.

Analysis record

Analysed
2 weeks ago
Version
v2.7.3
Artifact
SHA256 A38…DA2
Source
Findings (non-IoC)

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

192 detail rows
Showing 25 of 41 · highest severity first

YARA Rule Matches

10 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
LOWpostinstall persistence mechanism 6
popup/credit-balance-refresh.jscontent/content.jsauth.js +3 more
-
LOWpostinstall obfuscation 23
_locales/tr/messages.jsoncontent/content.js_locales/zh/messages.json +20 more
-
LOWpostinstall crypto operations 8
content/content.jsauth.jscontent/disney-interceptor.js +5 more
-
LOWpostinstall file manipulation 20
content/iqiyi-interceptor.jscontent/streaming-cue-buffer.jsauth.js +17 more
-
LOWpostinstall environment access 1
popup/popup.js
-
LOWpostinstall network communication 37
_locales/ko/messages.jsoncontent/iqiyi-interceptor.jscontent/primevideo-timeline.js +34 more
-
LOWpostinstall system command 11
content/content.jspopup/popup.csspopup/duration-detector.js +8 more
-
LOWpostinstall file download 42
content/crunchyroll-interceptor.js_locales/tr/messages.jsoncontent/netflix-interceptor.js +39 more
-
LOWNoUseWeakRandom 2
background/service-worker.jspopup/analytics.js
-
LOWLocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed 1
popup/popup.js
-

Publisher Evidence

Limited evidence

Vinner Vi

Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.

Firefox does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.

32
Noisy-finding weight
x1.00
Publisher domain
vinnervi.com
Observed
Store verification signal
Limited signal
Limited
Extension portfolio
1
Portfolio

13 evidence rows available.

Finding Categories

40
Network
293
IoC Indicators

YARA Rules Matched

10 rules(151 hits)
postinstall persistence mechanism postinstall obfuscation postinstall crypto operations postinstall file manipulation postinstall environment access postinstall network communication postinstall system command postinstall file download NoUseWeakRandom LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed

Requested Permissions

119 permissions
identity

Access your identity and sign-in tokens

High
activeTab
Medium
tabs
Medium
scripting
Low
storage
Low
alarms
Low
notifications
Low
*://*.youtube.com/*
Low
*://youtu.be/*
Low
*://*.bilibili.com/*
Low
*://*.bilibili.tv/*
Low
*://*.dailymotion.com/*
Low
*://*.vimeo.com/*
Low
https://vinnervi.com/oauth-callback/*
Low
*://*.x.com/*
Low
*://*.twitter.com/*
Low
*://*.tiktok.com/*
Low
*://*.nicovideo.jp/*
Low
*://*.instagram.com/*
Low
*://*.facebook.com/*
Low
*://*.douyin.com/*
Low
*://*.twitch.tv/*
Low
*://*.missav.ws/*
Low
*://missav.ws/*
Low
*://*.missav.ai/*
Low
*://missav.ai/*
Low
*://*.pornhub.com/*
Low
*://pornhub.com/*
Low
*://*.boyfriendtv.com/*
Low
*://boyfriendtv.com/*
Low
*://*.dsav.app/*
Low
*://dsav.app/*
Low
*://*.dsav26.app/*
Low
*://*.dsav27.app/*
Low
*://*.dsav28.app/*
Low
*://*.dsav29.app/*
Low
*://*.dsav30.app/*
Low
*://*.dsysav.com/*
Low
*://dsysav.com/*
Low
*://*.dsysav.app/*
Low
*://dsysav.app/*
Low
*://*.crunchyroll.com/*
Low
*://*.viki.com/*
Low
*://*.iq.com/*
Low
*://*.pinterest.com/*
Low
*://pinterest.com/*
Low
*://*.netflix.com/*
Low
*://*.primevideo.com/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.ca/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.ca/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.mx/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.mx/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.br/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.br/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.co.uk/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.co.uk/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.de/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.de/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.fr/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.fr/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.it/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.it/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.es/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.es/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.nl/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.nl/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.se/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.se/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.pl/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.pl/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.be/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.be/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.ie/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.ie/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.co.jp/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.co.jp/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.in/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.in/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.au/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.au/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.sg/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.sg/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.tr/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.com.tr/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.ae/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.ae/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.sa/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.sa/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.eg/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.eg/dp/*
Low
*://*.amazon.co.za/gp/video/*
Low
*://*.amazon.co.za/dp/*
Low
*://*.disneyplus.com/*
Low
*://*.max.com/*
Low
*://*.hbomax.com/*
Low
*://*.vidmoly.me/*
Low
*://vidmoly.me/*
Low
*://*.vidmoly.biz/*
Low
*://vidmoly.biz/*
Low
*://*.rpmvip.com/*
Low
*://rpmvip.com/*
Low
*://*.bitchute.com/*
Low
*://bitchute.com/*
Low
*://*.ok.ru/*
Low
*://ok.ru/*
Low
*://*.odnoklassniki.ru/*
Low
*://odnoklassniki.ru/*
Low
*://*.1shows.org/*
Low
*://1shows.org/*
Low
*://*.videasy.to/*
Low
*://videasy.to/*
Low
https://api.vinnervi.com/*
Low
https://vinnervi.com/*
Low
https://accounts.google.com/*
Low
https://www.googleapis.com/*
Low
https://api.bilibili.com/*
Low
https://www.google-analytics.com/*
Low

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

AI Subtitle Translator (developer Vinner Vi, version 2.7.1, Firefox, 24 users) advertises live subtitle translation for YouTube, Bilibili, TikTok and roughly fifty other video sites in thirty-plus languages, on a credit model with 50 free translations. Nothing in the scan contradicts that description. Across 481 findings there are zero malware signatures, zero obfuscation matches, zero exposed secrets, zero dependency hits and zero tool-poisoning hits. What remains is network and code-quality noise around code any working translator would contain.

The 38 network findings are fetch call sites: NET-FETCH-auth.js-285, NET-FETCH-auth.js-381, NET-FETCH-auth.js-496, NET-FETCH-auth.js-532, NET-FETCH-popup/popup.js-5284, five entries in background/service-worker.js between lines 598 and 1566 plus three more near line 2900, NET-FETCH-content/content.js-1587 and NET-FETCH-content/primevideo-interceptor.js-645. A translation product has to call a backend to translate, and it has to call an identity provider to meter credits. The 744453102252-6p9fgjl10hs7h5njuo81m9mav31i3p7a.apps.googleusercontent.com client IDs sit next to those calls, which fits a Google sign-in flow for the credit balance. content/primevideo-interceptor.js matches the feature set: Prime Video serves subtitles from its own player, so lifting the text means hooking the player's media requests.

The 291 indicator entries look large in bulk and are not. The endpoints include aljazeera.com, alison.com, amazon.co.uk, amazon.co.jp, academy.scienceforsport.com, academy.inkmentors.com and streaming hosts such as 123av.com and alloha.yani.tv. That reads as the supported-site allowlist the listing itself promises, and the content script has to recognise each host before it runs. Several of the streaming hosts (ag2m4.cfd, 8tsu.net) are piracy-adjacent, which is a content-policy question rather than a security one. No finding anywhere in the scan pairs a cookie or credential read with a post to any of these hosts.

The 151 code-smell matches are all low severity, and not one shares a file with a malware signature. That is the shape this scanner produces on any bundled service worker, not a detection. A skeptic would point at auth.js holding Google OAuth client IDs while background/service-worker.js makes repeated network calls, and would note the single manifest-analysis finding plus empty permission and host-permission arrays in the data we could read. That gap is real: we cannot confirm from this bundle which origins the manifest grants at install time. It still does not tip the verdict, because a malicious package would need somewhere to send data, and the only destinations here are a site allowlist, Google identity endpoints, and the vendor's own translation service.

There is no malware signature, no obfuscated payload, no credential access and no hijacked search or new-tab behaviour in the evidence. The finding volume is an artefact of domain extraction and broad JavaScript rules.

Key Reasons

  • Zero malware signatures, zero obfuscation, zero secrets and zero tool-poisoning matches across 481 findings
  • The 291 indicators are a supported-site allowlist (aljazeera.com, amazon.co.uk, alison.com, streaming hosts) that matches the advertised 50+ site coverage
  • NET-FETCH hits such as auth.js:285 and background/service-worker.js:598 are ordinary API and sign-in calls required by a translation service with Google OAuth client IDs
  • 151 code-smell matches are all low severity and none shares a file with a malware signature
  • Named developer, versioned release 2.7.1, no browser-hijack or credential-access behaviour in the evidence

False Positive Considerations

  • Domain extractor counting the extension's supported-site list as 291 indicators
  • Low-severity code-smell rules firing on a bundled background service worker
  • NET-FETCH rule firing on every ordinary fetch call site in auth.js, popup.js and service-worker.js
  • Medium-severity labelling applied to network call sites with no destination analysis

Reviewed 2026-10-18; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 78%.

Firefox version history

Risk trend by version

23 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.

Selected
85
Change since first
+26
Change from previous
No change
Versions:
First analyzed version
1.4.0
May 30, 2026
Risk range
58 to 85
Across analyzed versions
Latest analyzed version
2.7.3
Oct 20, 2026
Selected version
critical
Version
v2.7.3
2 weeks ago
Risk score
85
Findings
485
Change vs previous
No change

Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.

About This Extension

<strong>Watch any video in your language.</strong> VinnerVi Subtitles uses AI to transcribe and translate the audio of YouTube™, Bilibili™, TikTok™, and 50+ other video sites into 30+ languages — in minutes, not days. ### What you get <ul><li><strong>Live subtitle overlay</strong> — translated captions appear directly on the video, synced to playback</li><li><strong>Downloadable subtitle files</strong> — SRT, VTT, and ASS formats for use in any video player</li><li><strong>30+ target languages</strong> — Korean, Japanese, Chinese, English, Spanish, French, German, Russian, Arabic, Hindi, Thai, Vietnamese and more</li><li><strong>Time range clipping</strong> — only translate the portion of the video you care about</li><li><strong>Batch translation</strong> — YouTube playlists and Bilibili multi-part videos submit all episodes in one click</li></ul> ### How it works <ol><li>Open any supported video page</li><li>Click the extension icon → pick your target language → submit</li><li>Track progress in the popup; live overlay appears when ready</li><li>Download the subtitle files for offline use</li></ol> ### Supported sites Hand-verified on YouTube, Bilibili, TikTok, Vimeo, Dailymotion, Twitch, Instagram, Facebook, X/Twitter, Nicovideo, Douyin, and 50+ more. ### Pricing 50 free credits on sign-up. Pay-as-you-go top-ups from $5, or subscribe from $6/month.

Frequently Asked Questions