Montara Pass
The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (55/100) still counts them. The review covers version 2.9.0, not the analysed version 2.13.0.
Analysis record
- Analysed
- Today 22 November 2026
- Version
- v2.13.0
- Artifact
- SHA256 18061e6a…8dee0d
- Detail
- Full list
Is Montara Pass safe?
Montara Pass fills and saves logins from an encrypted vault, so it has to talk to the company's sync service to do its job. The scan recorded traffic to montarapass.com, app.montarapass.com and docs.montarapass.com, which are the vendor's own addresses. The permission lists came back empty, which for a password filler is odd enough that we treat it as a gap in collection rather than proof the add-on asks for nothing.
The two medium findings, NET-FETCH-chunks/use-vault-items-BVE-YvqN.js-1 and NET-FETCH-chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.js-1, are fetch calls inside bundled code. If they were malicious they would be shipping your decrypted logins somewhere. Here they sit in files named for pulling vault items into the popup, and the only service address they reach is the vendor's own domain.
Most of the finding count is scanner noise. The endpoint list is full of things like nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place and window.innerheight-n.top, which are pieces of JavaScript property access and arithmetic that a pattern matcher read as web addresses. The .arpa entries such as ipv4only.arpa and service.arpa are reserved DNS names used by network libraries. The 68 low-severity code-quality hits fire on any bundled JavaScript. No malware signature matched, no obfuscation was found, no secrets were exposed.
What would change our mind: a request carrying vault data to an address outside montarapass.com, or a decoded manifest showing permissions the scan missed.
Evidence ledger
Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer
YARA Rule Matches
11 rules| Severity | Rule | Hits | Files | Metadata |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOW | postinstall persistence mechanism | 4 | content-scripts/content.jscontent-scripts/passkey-page.jsbackground.js +1 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file download | 8 | chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.jschunks/popup-DcLzl2gS.jschunks/es6-qC4ayDAm.js +5 more | - |
| LOW | NoUseWeakRandom | 3 | chunks/form-BlPxEOY_.jscontent-scripts/content.jschunks/layout-DMLkDfhC.js | - |
| LOW | postinstall environment access | 10 | chunks/inline-CchG6ySY.jschunks/form-BlPxEOY_.jschunks/index.esm-JEo9WZbq.js +7 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall crypto operations | 18 | chunks/items-CZ7D7QQp.jschunks/schemas-ByTpYaw6.jsbackground.js +15 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall file manipulation | 13 | chunks/items-CZ7D7QQp.jschunks/offscreen-JofPIwNg.jscontent-scripts/passkey-page.js +10 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall network communication | 11 | content-scripts/content.jschunks/form-BlPxEOY_.jsMETA-INF/manifest.mf +8 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall registry modification | 2 | chunks/layout-DMLkDfhC.jschunks/full-vault-B6zrefVk.js | - |
| LOW | postinstall obfuscation | 11 | manifest.jsonchunks/passkey-D5uUxVFo.jschunks/full-vault-B6zrefVk.js +8 more | - |
| LOW | postinstall system command | 12 | chunks/items-CZ7D7QQp.jschunks/inline-CchG6ySY.jschunks/offscreen-JofPIwNg.js +9 more | - |
| LOW | LocalStorageShouldNotBeUsed | 1 | chunks/full-vault-B6zrefVk.js | - |
Publisher Evidence
Limited evidenceMontara Project
Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.
Firefox does not expose the same publisher verification data as IDE stores, so this score is deliberately conservative.
13 evidence rows available.
Finding Categories
YARA Rules Matched
11 rules(93 hits)Requested Permissions
8 permissionsAccess your identity and sign-in tokens
AI Security Report
AI Security Review
Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.
Montara Pass is a password manager built by Montara Project, and its job is to fill logins from an encrypted vault. The two highest-severity findings are medium network hits, NET-FETCH-chunks/use-vault-items-BVE-YvqN.js-1 and NET-FETCH-chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.js-1. Both sit in chunk files whose names describe the work: loading vault items and pulling in a plugin bundle. A vault filler that never opened a connection could not sync anything.
The 58 indicator entries are where the volume comes from, and they collapse on inspection. The endpoint list carries ipv4only.arpa, service.arpa, resolver.arpa, eap.arpa and 6tisch.arpa, all special-use DNS names that turn up in network discovery code. It also carries nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place, globalthis.chrome, button.link, span.apple and secret.contact, which are JavaScript property access chains (NodeFilter.SHOW, GlobalThis.chrome) read as hostnames by the extractor. window.innerheight-n.top is arithmetic lifted from minified source. None of these resolve to anything.
The domains that are real belong to the vendor or to libraries it bundles. montarapass.com, app.montarapass.com and docs.montarapass.com are the service the extension exists to talk to. prosemirror.net and tailwindcss.com are the homepages of the editor and CSS packages shipped in the bundled assets. mozilla.com is a documentation link. Nothing in the list points at an unrelated third party.
The remaining 68 findings are code-smell rules at low severity, the kind that match any non-trivial JavaScript bundle. No malware signature matched. Obfuscation findings are at zero, so the chunks read as minified build output rather than packed payloads. Secret and dependency categories are empty as well.
The strongest argument against this reading is that a password manager is the most attractive target in the store, the publisher is small, and the extraction recorded no permissions and no host permissions at all. That last point deserves care: a filler that reads forms and injects credentials needs host access, so an empty list here points at a collection gap rather than a genuinely permissionless add-on. The gap doesn't move the verdict, because the network findings themselves are ordinary vault traffic to the vendor's own domain, and no file in the scan sends data anywhere else.
Two things would change the verdict. A network finding to a domain outside montarapass.com would, and so would a decoded manifest showing broad host permissions the extractor missed. Until one of those shows up, this is a small password manager whose score is driven by bundled code and pattern-matching noise.
Key Reasons
- Only network findings are fetch calls in chunk files named for vault items and plugin loading (chunks/use-vault-items-BVE-YvqN.js, chunks/_virtual_wxt-html-plugins-BaAyCpKt.js), consistent with a password manager syncing from app.montarapass.com
- Zero malware signatures, zero obfuscation, zero secret and zero dependency findings across 128 total findings
- IoC list is dominated by property-access chains (nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place, globalthis.chrome) and reserved .arpa names (ipv4only.arpa, service.arpa) that cannot resolve
- Named developer with matching first-party domains montarapass.com, app.montarapass.com and docs.montarapass.com
- The remaining 68 findings are low-severity code-smell rules that fire on any minified JavaScript bundle
False Positive Considerations
- XIOC misparses of JavaScript property chains as hostnames (nodefilter.show, xa.prototype.place, globalthis.chrome, secret.contact)
- Reserved special-use .arpa DNS names from network discovery code counted as endpoints (ipv4only.arpa, service.arpa, resolver.arpa, eap.arpa, 6tisch.arpa)
- 68 low-severity code-smell rules firing on minified dist/bundle output
- Library homepages and first-party vendor domains (prosemirror.net, tailwindcss.com, montarapass.com) flagged as suspicious endpoints
Reviewed 2026-10-28 · version 2.9.0; recommended action: suppress false positive; model confidence 82%.
Firefox version history
Risk trend by version
5 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates: First seen by Risky Plugins.
Pick any point on the chart, then open the Source tab to read that version's code.
Source Code Not Available
Source code is not available for this version of the extension.
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