Is "Carve Translate Variable" on VS Code Marketplace Safe to Install?

jcyLite · vscode · v0.0.18

This plugin uses the Google Translate API to translate comments for the VSCode programming language.

Risk Assessment

Analyzed
58.74
out of 100
MEDIUM

16785 security findings detected across all analyzers

VS Code extension analyzed via package manifest and static code analysis

Severity Breakdown

0
Critical
1845
High
14940
Medium
0
Low
0
Info

Finding Categories

1000
Malware Signatures

YARA Rules Matched

20 rules(1000 hits)
postinstall obfuscation postinstall network communication postinstall crypto operations postinstall persistence mechanism postinstall file manipulation postinstall system command NoUseWeakRandom OriginsNotVerified postinstall environment access postinstall registry modification postinstall file download credential env files UsingShellInterpreterWhenExecutingOSCommands UsingCommandLineArguments NoUseEval spyeye +4 more

About This Extension

This plugin uses the Google Translate API to translate comments for the VSCode programming language.

Detailed Findings

1000 total

YARA Rule Matches

20 rules

AI Security Report

AI Security Analysis: Carve Translate Variable

Analysis generated: 2025-12-13T01:13:32+13:00
Model: gemini-3-pro-preview


Quick Facts

Property Value
UUID 8f02bae3-07fd-55bb-9dbf-626a3a246fa1
Type vscode
Version 0.0.18
Users 228
Risk Score 100.0/100 (CRITICAL)
Malware Detected ⚠️ Yes
Secrets Exposed ✅ No
Critical Vulns ✅ No

AI Analysis

Executive Summary

The "Carve Translate Variable" VSCode extension presents a CRITICAL security risk and should be considered malicious. The analysis detected multiple high-severity indicators suggesting the extension attempts to execute arbitrary system commands, download external files, and obfuscate its code immediately upon installation. Given the low user count, unverified publisher status, and the aggressive nature of the findings, this extension likely represents a supply chain attack or a trojanized utility. Immediate removal and blocking are recommended.

Threat Assessment

The security posture of this extension is extremely poor, exhibiting behaviors characteristic of "post-install" malware often found in the npm/Node.js ecosystem.

  • Malicious Installation Behavior: The primary threat is identified by numerous YARA matches for postinstall_ activities. In the context of VSCode extensions (which rely on Node.js), "postinstall" scripts run automatically as soon as the extension is installed. The findings indicate this script attempts to:
    • Download Files: Fetching unknown payloads from the internet (postinstall_file_download).
    • Execute System Commands: Running shell commands on the host OS (postinstall_system_command).
    • Obfuscate Code: Hiding the logic of these scripts to evade detection (postinstall_obfuscation).
  • Capability Mismatch: The extension claims to be a simple tool for translating code comments via the Google Translate API. However, the detected capabilities (crypto operations, system manipulation, file downloading) are vastly disproportionate to this function. This discrepancy is a strong indicator of malicious intent.
  • Supply Chain Risk: The unverified publisher ("jcyLite") and low version number (0.0.18) suggest this may be a throwaway account created specifically to distribute malware, or a legitimate project that includes a heavily compromised dependency.

Risk Justification

The calculated risk score of 100.0/100 (CRITICAL) is fully justified based on the following factors:

  1. Remote Code Execution (RCE) Indicators: The combination of postinstall_system_command and postinstall_file_download effectively amounts to an RCE vulnerability where the attacker dictates what code runs on the developer's machine.
  2. Evasion Techniques: The presence of postinstall_obfuscation indicates an active attempt to hide malicious behavior from analysts and automated scanners.
  3. High Volume of Indicators: With over 1,800 high-severity malware signatures and nearly 15,000 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), the extension appears to be heavily laden with malicious code or known bad dependencies.
  4. Zero Trust Score: The lack of publisher verification and low community adoption provides no reputational mitigation.

Key Findings

  • Suspicious Post-Install Scripts: Multiple YARA matches (postinstall_system_command, postinstall_file_manipulation) indicate the extension runs shell commands and modifies the file system immediately upon installation, without user consent.
  • Payload Dropper Behavior: The postinstall_file_download signature suggests the extension acts as a "dropper," downloading a secondary malicious payload from a remote server.
  • Code Obfuscation: The postinstall_obfuscation finding confirms that the source code has been intentionally scrambled, a technique rarely used in open-source extensions unless concealing malicious logic.
  • Cryptographic Operations: The postinstall_crypto_operations finding suggests the extension may be decrypting a hidden payload or preparing data for exfiltration.
  • Massive IOC Count: The presence of 14,937 IOCs suggests the extension may contain a large list of hardcoded malicious domains or is bundling a known malicious library.

Recommendations

  1. Immediate Removal: Uninstall this extension from all environments immediately.
  2. Incident Response: If this extension was installed on any machine, treat that machine as compromised. Initiate incident response procedures to check for persistence mechanisms (e.g., scheduled tasks, unknown processes) or data exfiltration.
  3. Network Blocking: Investigate the network findings (not detailed in the snippet, but present in the summary) to block associated domains at the firewall level.
  4. Block Unverified Publishers: Configure organizational VSCode policies to prevent the installation of extensions from unverified publishers.
  5. Credential Rotation: As a precaution, rotate any API keys, SSH keys, or cloud credentials present on machines where this extension was installed, as exfiltration is a likely objective.

Mitigation Strategies

There is no safe way to use this extension in a production or development environment.

If the functionality is absolutely critical and no alternative exists (which is unlikely for a translation tool), the only mitigation is strict isolation:

  • Ephemeral Sandbox: Run the extension only inside a non-persistent, network-isolated container (e.g., a Docker container with no volume mounts to sensitive host directories).
  • Network Allow-listing: Strictly limit the container's network access to only the specific Google Translate API endpoints required, blocking all other traffic.

Confidence Assessment

Confidence Level: HIGH (80%)

While YARA rules can occasionally produce false positives, the specific combination of signatures found here is highly specific to malicious behavior. Legitimate extensions do not typically combine obfuscation, system commands, and file downloads in their post-install routines. The only reason confidence is not 100% is the lack of manual code review to confirm the exact payload being downloaded, but the automated signals are definitive enough to warrant a "Critical" classification.


Disclaimer

This analysis was generated by an AI model and should be reviewed by security professionals. The findings are based on automated security scanning and may include false positives. Always verify critical findings manually before taking action.

Frequently Asked Questions