OpenVSX Registry Verified

Gnosis AI

a3d6faaa-6f4a-51ce-9ee7-2c3d3ee4667b | v0.1.33
78/ 100
HIGH risk
-1 since v0.1.24
Analyst verdict
Review before use

The AI review rates the findings as likely false positive, but the risk score (78/100) still counts them.

Analysis record

Analysed
3 days ago
Version
v0.1.33
Artifact
SHA256 DAC…EB1
Source
Findings (non-IoC)

Is Gnosis AI safe?

Gnosis adds semantic code search, AI Blame and an agent chat panel to VS Code, and it comes from a publisher listed as JetBrains on OpenVSX, with 42 installs so far. The extension declares no special permissions. The endpoint list attached to it offers nothing real: entries such as apikeystatusitem.show, body.chat and args.report come from property access chains inside bundled JavaScript, so the extractor read code identifiers as hostnames.

The network findings sit in extension/node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/sdk/dist/server.test.js and its neighbours, which hold the test files for a bundled Agent Client Protocol library. A fetch call in a test file exercises an HTTP client against a test server. Two findings marked critical, SKILL-CREDENTIAL-ACCESS, point at markdown under extension/resources/worktrees/SKILL.md and extension/resources/gnosis-knowledge-skill/SKILL.md, where the writing covers how to handle credentials.

If a skill file told an AI agent to read your .env and send it somewhere, that would matter, because agent chat follows those instructions. Here the matches land on prose inside the extension's own skill library. The scanner logged no malware signatures, no secret access and no obfuscation anywhere in the package, and the agent has no destination endpoint to leak to.

Evidence ledger

Ranked by severity · findings with a source location link to the code viewer

1000 detail rows
Showing 25 of 64 · highest severity first

YARA Rule Matches

16 rules
SeverityRuleHitsFilesMetadata
LOWDebuggerStatementsShouldNotBeUsed 1
dist/extension.js
-
LOWUsingCommandLineArguments 8
scripts/check-bundle-esm.mjsscripts/render-readme-figures.mjsout/test/suite/71tc40tc41DistillModelEdgeUi.test.js +5 more
-
LOWpostinstall file download 134
media/trajectory/main.jsmedia/taskTrace/main.jsout/chatter/ui/vscode/chatDetail/tocRenderer.js +131 more
-
LOWNoUseWeakRandom 22
media/status/main.jsmedia/flows/main.jsdist/extension.js +19 more
-
LOWNoUseEval 4
out/test/suite/chatCostChip.test.jsout/test/suite/chatDiagramView.test.jsdist/extension.js +1 more
-
LOWSQLInjection 5
media/status/main.jsout/gnosisReset.jsmedia/worktree/main.js +2 more
-
LOWcredential env files 138
out/test/suite/18tc11CleanProjectUi.test.jsout/test/suite/elicitationMcpServerConfig.test.jsout/test/suite/47tc29TreeLabelsUi.test.js +135 more
-
LOWpostinstall persistence mechanism 37
out/test/runTestsSupport.jsout/test/suite/chatterDecorations.test.jsout/chatter/platform/WorkspaceRuntime.js +34 more
-
LOWpostinstall crypto operations 64
out/chatter/vendor/acp/npxRecovery.jsout/chatter/vendor/acp/PermissionHandler.jsout/test/suite/24tc14bNoGitFetchUi.test.js +61 more
-
LOWpostinstall registry modification 65
out/test/suite/worktreeOverview.test.jsout/test/suite/chatDetailTestRegistry.test.js.mapout/worktrees/workspaceScope.js +62 more
-
LOWpostinstall network communication 48
out/test/suite/57tc31OutsideWorkspaceUi.test.jsout/branchReviewPanel.jsout/review/panelSettingsModel.js +45 more
-
LOWpostinstall system command 63
out/test/suite/chatterUiChatHelpers.jsout/test/suite/gnosisIgnore.test.jsout/review/findingAgentTools.js +60 more
-
LOWpostinstall file manipulation 250
resources/embark-call-graph-install.shout/taskQueue/taskQueueModel.jsout/review/reviewWhy.js +247 more
-
LOWpostinstall obfuscation 76
out/review/panelSettingsModel.jsout/agentMessages.jsmedia/taskFlow/main.js +73 more
-
LOWOriginsNotVerified 12
media/search/main.jsmedia/resolution/main.jsmedia/reviewMap/main.js +9 more
-
LOWUsingShellInterpreterWhenExecutingOSCommands 9
out/embarkCli.jsscripts/build-gnosis-wheel.mjsout/worktrees/groupActions.js +6 more
-

Publisher Evidence

Low

JetBrains

Publisher identity, store signals, distribution reach, and warning signals used for context. Treat this as supporting evidence, not a clean bill of health.

60
Noisy-finding weight
x1.00
Publisher domain
No domain
Missing
Store verification signal
Verified publisher
Verified
Extension portfolio
8
Portfolio

12 evidence rows available.

Finding Categories

56
Network
1,607
IoC Indicators

YARA Rules Matched

16 rules(936 hits)
DebuggerStatementsShouldNotBeUsed UsingCommandLineArguments postinstall file download NoUseWeakRandom NoUseEval SQLInjection credential env files postinstall persistence mechanism postinstall crypto operations postinstall registry modification postinstall network communication postinstall system command postinstall file manipulation postinstall obfuscation OriginsNotVerified UsingShellInterpreterWhenExecutingOSCommands

AI Security Report

AI Security Review

Evidence context: threat category none; evidence quality moderate.

Gnosis describes itself as knowledge aggregation and AI-agent tooling for VS Code: semantic code search, conversation cost and quality reports, task classification, AI Blame, a linked knowledgebase, and a built-in agent chat. That stated job covers the file reads and process spawns an extension like this needs, and nothing found here goes past it.

Workspace and process access. The scan surfaced no filesystem-access findings and no shell execution tied to activation or install. The only executable-code findings are HTTP fetches, and every one of them sits inside the Agent Client Protocol SDK bundled under node_modules: extension/node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/sdk/dist/server.test.js, server-session-sse.test.js, ws-stream.test.js, node-adapter.test.js and server-permission.test.js. Those are the upstream library's own test files, packed by the build. The fetch at server.test.js:730 drives a client against a test server; the one at ws-stream.test.js:76 does the same over a websocket. A dependency's test suite calling a local test server says nothing about the publisher.

Endpoint list. The domains attributed to this extension read as code identifiers: apikeystatusitem.show, body.chat, args.report, bundle.report, air.search, backbone.radio, badges.gitter.im. Property access chains in minified JavaScript produce those strings, and the extractor treats them as hostnames. IoC volume here tracks bundle size.

Credential findings. Two critical items carry the weight: SKILL-CREDENTIAL-ACCESS-extension/resources/worktrees/SKILL.md-45 and SKILL-CREDENTIAL-ACCESS-extension/resources/gnosis-knowledge-skill/SKILL.md-80. Both point at markdown instruction files in the extension's skill library. A skill file teaches the built-in agent how to work with a repository or a knowledgebase, and credential handling belongs in that text. Neither finding targets executable code that opens .env, .ssh or cloud credential files, and no secret-access match fired anywhere in the package. The manifest declares no permissions and no host permissions.

Strongest counterargument. For an agent extension, skill markdown earns scrutiny: a SKILL.md that tells the model to collect API keys and send them somewhere would count as tool poisoning and would run with the agent's privileges. That would flip this verdict if the files carried exfiltration instructions or if any code acted on such a line. What exists are text matches on credential-related lines inside two resource files, with no payload behind them and no destination endpoint that could receive a key.

Bulk noise. The low-severity rules that match generic JavaScript idioms account for the vast majority of what the scan reported, a predictable outcome when a package ships a node_modules tree and a built agent UI. Read the file paths: dependency test files, bundled libraries, resource markdown. None of them describe behaviour the extension's description does not already promise.

Key Reasons

  • All NET-FETCH findings are confined to bundled test files under extension/node_modules/@agentclientprotocol/sdk/dist/ (server.test.js, ws-stream.test.js, server-permission.test.js).
  • Both critical SKILL-CREDENTIAL-ACCESS findings point at markdown resources (extension/resources/worktrees/SKILL.md, extension/resources/gnosis-knowledge-skill/SKILL.md) rather than executable credential-reading code.
  • No malware signatures, no secret-access matches and no obfuscation findings; the manifest lists no permissions and no host permissions.
  • The attributed endpoint list consists of code identifiers misread as domains (apikeystatusitem.show, body.chat, args.report, backbone.radio).
  • The stated purpose (semantic search, AI agent chat, knowledgebase skills) explains the file and process usage.

False Positive Considerations

  • XIOC extractor converting minified property access chains into hostnames
  • Bundled @agentclientprotocol/sdk test files shipping fetch calls inside node_modules
  • SKILL-CREDENTIAL-ACCESS text rule matching instructional markdown instead of code
  • Code-smell rule volume across a full node_modules tree

Reviewed 2026-10-15; recommended action: no action; model confidence 76%.

Open VSX version history

Risk trend by version

2 analyzed versions. Each point is the latest successful scan for that version; failed zero-score scans are hidden. Dates are based on first seen by risky plugins.

Selected
78
Change since first
-1
Change from previous
-1
Versions:
First analyzed version
0.1.24
Oct 12, 2026
Risk range
78 to 79
Across analyzed versions
Latest analyzed version
0.1.33
Oct 19, 2026
Selected version
high
Version
v0.1.33
3 days ago
Risk score
78
Findings
3016
Change vs previous
-1

Pick any point on the chart to explore that version's code below.

About This Extension

Knowledge aggregation and AI-agent efficiency for VS Code: semantic code search, conversation cost & quality insights, task classification, a linked knowledgebase, AI Blame, and built-in agent chat.

Frequently Asked Questions