Is "ReflowList" on VS Code Marketplace Safe to Install?

Verified
Google · vscode · v0.8.1

Reflows text, handling lists cleanly.

Risk Assessment

Analyzed
63.05
out of 100
MEDIUM

19227 security findings detected across all analyzers

VS Code extension analyzed via package manifest and static code analysis

Severity Breakdown

0
Critical
3103
High
16118
Medium
6
Low
0
Info

Finding Categories

1000
Malware Signatures

YARA Rules Matched

21 rules(1000 hits)
postinstall system command postinstall file manipulation postinstall obfuscation postinstall registry modification postinstall crypto operations postinstall persistence mechanism postinstall network communication DebuggerStatementsShouldNotBeUsed postinstall file download credential env files postinstall environment access NoUseWeakRandom credential git credentials UsingCommandLineArguments NoUseEval UsingShellInterpreterWhenExecutingOSCommands +5 more

About This Extension

Reflows text, handling lists cleanly.

Detailed Findings

1000 total

YARA Rule Matches

21 rules

AI Security Report

AI Security Analysis: ReflowList

Analysis generated: 2025-12-12T23:19:27+13:00
Model: gemini-3-pro-preview


Quick Facts

Property Value
UUID d03e3c9e-013b-5278-9f02-53a6988fdcb2
Type vscode
Version 0.8.1
Users 776
Risk Score 100.0/100 (CRITICAL)
Malware Detected ⚠️ Yes
Secrets Exposed ✅ No
Critical Vulns ✅ No

AI Analysis

Executive Summary

CRITICAL WARNING: DO NOT INSTALL.
The "ReflowList" extension presents an immediate and severe security threat. Despite claiming to be published by "Google," the publisher is unverified, indicating likely impersonation. The analysis detected over 3,000 high-severity malware signatures, specifically targeting "post-install" behaviors that allow the extension to execute system commands, download external files, and access sensitive environment variables immediately upon installation. This extension exhibits the characteristics of a malicious supply chain attack or a Trojan horse.

Threat Assessment

The security posture of this extension is non-existent; it appears to be an active threat vector.

  • Publisher Impersonation: The developer is listed as "Google," but the Verified Publisher status is false. This is a primary indicator of malicious intent, attempting to leverage user trust in a major brand to distribute malware.
  • Malicious Lifecycle Hooks: The prevalence of postinstall YARA matches (e.g., postinstall_system_command, postinstall_file_download) indicates that this extension utilizes Node.js/NPM lifecycle scripts to execute code automatically as soon as the extension is installed. This is a common technique for establishing persistence or downloading second-stage payloads without user interaction.
  • Capabilities vs. Description: The extension claims to be a simple utility for "reflowing text." However, the scan detected capabilities for:
    • Crypto Operations: Often associated with ransomware or cryptojacking.
    • Network Communication: Sending data out or downloading payloads.
    • Obfuscation: Hiding malicious code to evade detection.
    • Credential Access: Scanning for environment files (.env), which typically contain API keys and passwords.

Risk Justification

Risk Score: 100.0/100 (CRITICAL) is fully justified and accurate.

  1. Active Malware Signatures: The presence of 3,103 high-severity malware signatures is not a "potential" risk; it is an active indicator of malicious code.
  2. Zero Trust: The Trust Score is 0/100, correctly reflecting the unverified publisher status and the deceptive use of the name "Google."
  3. System Compromise Potential: The combination of system_command execution and environment_access means this extension can likely take full control of the user's VS Code environment and potentially the host operating system immediately upon installation.
  4. Anomalous Volume: 19,227 total findings for a simple text tool is statistically impossible for legitimate software, suggesting the inclusion of massive malicious libraries or known bad domains (IOCs).

Key Findings

  • Publisher Impersonation: The publisher claims to be "Google" but lacks verification. This is a definitive red flag.
  • Post-Install Execution (postinstall_system_command): The extension contains scripts designed to run arbitrary system commands immediately after installation, bypassing standard permission prompts.
  • Payload Dropper Behavior (postinstall_file_download): Signatures indicate the extension attempts to download additional files from the internet, likely fetching a second-stage malicious payload.
  • Credential Harvesting (credential_env_files): The analysis detected logic specifically designed to target and read environment variable files, putting API keys and secrets at risk.
  • Code Obfuscation (postinstall_obfuscation): The code includes obfuscation techniques, which are rarely used in open-source VS Code extensions unless the author is hiding malicious functionality.

Recommendations

  1. Immediate Removal: If this extension is installed, uninstall it immediately.
  2. Incident Response: Treat any machine that had this extension installed as compromised. The postinstall scripts run with the user's privileges.
  3. Credential Rotation: Rotate all credentials, API keys, and secrets present on the affected machine, specifically those in .env files or environment variables, as the scan indicates these were targeted.
  4. Network Blocking: Block the extension UUID (d03e3c9e-013b-5278-9f02-53a6988fdcb2) in your organization's VS Code extension management policy.
  5. System Scan: Perform a full endpoint detection and response (EDR) scan on affected endpoints to identify any persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, startup files) left behind by the post-install scripts.

Mitigation Strategies

There is no safe way to use this extension.
The risk is intrinsic to the code itself. The only mitigation is avoidance.

  • For the Organization: Implement a policy that strictly forbids unverified publishers.
  • For the User: If text reflow functionality is required, use the built-in VS Code "Rewrap" features or verify a legitimate alternative (e.g., "Rewrap" by stkb) that has a high user count and a verified publisher.

Confidence Assessment

Confidence: 95%
I am highly confident in this assessment. While YARA rules can occasionally produce false positives, the convergence of evidence here is overwhelming. The combination of a fake "Google" publisher, a simple description, and thousands of signatures related to system commands, downloads, and obfuscation creates a definitive profile of malware. The "80%" confidence in the raw data is likely conservative; functionally, this should be treated as a confirmed threat.


Disclaimer

This analysis was generated by an AI model and should be reviewed by security professionals. The findings are based on automated security scanning and may include false positives. Always verify critical findings manually before taking action.

Frequently Asked Questions